The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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argain with. Hitler had an offer that the Western countries could not have outbid. Therefore, the turning point was not really the willingness of the Whitehall, but rather profit-based calculations of the Kremlin. There was also a lot ambiguity regarding the real purposes of the Soviet. As Churchill pointed out, Russia „is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma”. 3 Still, Western Powers put their faith in a possible new Entente that would have covered Britain, France and Russia against Germany. Therefore, the conclusion the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was ultimately a shock to their policies. Traditional British policy was anything but faithful to Soviet maneuvers. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was disinclined to believe that the Russians could make a deal with Germany. In a letter to his sister, dated 10 June, 1939, he wrote: „I can’t make up my mind whether the Bolshies are double crossing us or whether they are only showing the cunning and suspicion of the peasant. On the whole I incline to the latter view.” On 2 July, 1939, his suspicion was further crystallized: „The Russian continue to create fresh difficulties… while I grow more and more suspicious of their good faith.’ 4 ” Of course, from the end of March, 1939, the British Intelligence and the Foreign Office were relatively well-informed that German-Soviet talks were in fact occurring. 5 The conclusion still surprised the British, because they previously thought that a tripartite agreement in Moscow could be realized. Just a few people foresaw the conclusion of the Pact, as did Sir Neville Henderson, then British ambassador to Germany. In a telegram to Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, Henderson stated that „the Hammer and the Anvil will one day join forces”; 6 referring to the strategic ‘pincer movement’ these two country could facilitate, if agreed upon. The reaction in Britain to the Pact was anxious and abrupt. Policy-makers were shocked, but their viewpoints ranged from cynical to depressive. Long-time Foreign Office official Harold Nicolson wrote the following: the pact „smashes our peace-front and makes our guarantees to Poland, Rumania and Greece very questionable. How Ribbentrop must chuckle. […] I fear that it means that we are humbled to the dust”. 7 Churchill regarded the conclusion of the Pact as ‘sinister news’, 8 Sir Alexander Cadogan have called that moment „A black day.” 9 On the 3 COLLINS, Thomas: Hand in Glove with Germany: Perspectives of Soviet Neutrality. University of Leeds, 2008. 4. 4 COLLINS, op. cit., 24. 5 Ibid. 23. 6 Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP) 3, VI, Henderson to Halifax, No. 347, July 18, 1939, p. 385. In: DOOLEY, Jacqueline: The Failure of a Mission: The Diplomacy of Sir Neville Henderson. University of Leeds, 2008. 48. 7 22 August, 1939. Harold Nicolson. Diaries and Letters. 1930-1964. (OLSON, Stanley ed.). Collins, London, 1980. 154. 8 COLLINS, op. cit., 25. 9 24 August, 1939. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan. O. M., 1938-1945. DILKS, David (ed.), Putnam, New York, 1972. 200. 126
22, Neville Henderson told a German interpreter with a bitter smile: „What a joke! We have a military mission to Moscow, and you make the agreement!” 10 The Russo-German Pact was in fact the most striking to Prime Minister Chamberlain. He interrupted his vacation on the Continent, and stayed anxiously in London. He and his wife were sitting on the sofa, unable to do anything else but waiting for news from Moscow. Finally, bad news had come. 11 Foreign Minister Lord Halifax was the only one who thought that „the situation is not so enormously changed”. 12 Honestly, one thing needs to be added to Halifax’s remark. He made this statement during a dinner with one of his friends, so A. Roberts believes that he might just wanted to put a brave face on. British policy of this period was ambivalent towards Germany. Even though they had decided to make one further attempt to mollify Hitler, they had to remind the Germans that no further concessions will be given. As early as the night of 22 August, Chamberlain had written a personal letter to the German Chancellor, claiming that whatever might be the nature of the Pact, „it cannot alter Great Britain’s obligation to Poland which His Majesty’s Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly and which they are determined to fulfill.” The British Prime Minister had a last attempt to take war off the table, and to not repeat tragic mistakes of 1914. As the letter continues: „His Majesty’s Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding,” 13 as there were on the eve of the first World War. Chamberlain’s letter was to be handed over by Sir Neville Henderson. Chamberlain also held a speech in the House of Commons, on the 24 August, in which he said: „I do not attempt to conceal from the House that this announcement came to the Government as a surprise, and a surprise of a very unpleasant character. […]” He had sent a message to Hitler: if he believes that Britain would leave Poland alone, he is wrong. As Chamberlain continues: „We felt it our first duty to remove any such dangerous illusion.” 14 On the same day, Lord Halifax gave a spookily similar speech in the House of Lords. 15 On the next day, the 25 August, Polish ambassador count Edward Raczynski had signed the Anglo-Polish Military Assistance Treaty in London. Besides the territorial guarantee already given to Poland, this treaty had called for military assistance. The 10 OETTINGER, Erich: The Thirteen Days before the War. In: The XXth Century 1943/5. 326. University of Hawaii at Manoa Library. http://libweb.hawaii.edu/libdept/russian/ XX/PDF/50-Volume5.pdf 6. November, 2009. 11 FUCHSER, Larry William: Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement: A Study in the Politics of History. W. W. Norton & Company, New York-London, 1982. 185. 12 ROBERTS, Andrew: The Holy Fox: The Life of Lord Halifax. Phoenix Giant Paperbacks, London, 1997. 167. 13 FUCHSER: op. cit., 185. p. 14 House of Commons Public Debates. Neville Chamberlain on International Situation, 24 Aug, 1939. 15 House of Lords Public Debates. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on International Situation. 24 Aug, 1939. 127
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
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Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
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Done in duplicate, in the German an
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Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
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Relations) are the focus of special
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Russian agreement (…) would allow
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Europe and on the French communists
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adopted a stance of denying the fac
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Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
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government (more than twenty) came,
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War. On the contrary, it shows that
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this anniversary and more widely of
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interesting: „Illusions. In summe
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Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
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One of the most influential associa
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Germanness in the provinces of West
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Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
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interwar period and the treaty was
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situation of rising danger accepted
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Manchukuo and broke relations with
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I would like to finish my article w
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party itself but for the whole Slov
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In summary, the group of the „Mod
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make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
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(Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
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have had a less serious effect on t
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not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78: Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80: individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82: esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84: expert of this matter 29 and had as
Page 85 and 86: Arendt on the contrary is in the op
Page 87 and 88: the „matter”, where there was a
Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101: public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103: Republicans. In the refugee camps i
Page 104 and 105: 102
Page 106 and 107: iron? Where can one find more nicke
Page 108 and 109: According to his diaries, the main
Page 110 and 111: announced: „We have no active all
Page 112 and 113: 110
Page 114 and 115: negative, an analysis of the disapp
Page 116 and 117: can let think of an imminent war po
Page 118 and 119: de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
Page 120 and 121: Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
Page 122 and 123: 120
Page 124 and 125: Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127: Lets us skip a few decades and list
Page 130 and 131: secret protocol clarified that the
Page 132 and 133: to reach out for Russia through the
Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137: At the same moment, we can note an
Page 138 and 139: Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
Page 140 and 141: war can still be avoided in June 19
Page 142 and 143: acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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Page 146 and 147: agreement” sound anachronistic. E
Page 148 and 149: 1939 between Germany and the Soviet
Page 150 and 151: Two ideas emerge from the press: on
Page 152 and 153: soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
Page 154 and 155: Moscow's line, with the national an
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Page 158 and 159: 2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
Page 160 and 161: The Eastern Polish border was not r
Page 162 and 163: Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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Page 166 and 167: Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
Page 168 and 169: could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
Page 170 and 171: independence, Romania was forced to
Page 172 and 173: importance for the events considere
Page 174 and 175: possible future opposition to the S
Page 176 and 177: ate of communists within the Jews o
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the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
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German Reactions A last point that
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