The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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following the fall of the Soviet block and the disappearance of the USSR, nor from the conditions of access to the German and Soviet archives which long remained closed, and only gradually opened up from the fifies on for Germany and from the nineties on for the USSR. But the story of the pact in France can not be studied without taking into account - this a French (and Italian) specificity - in Western democraties after 1945, which is to say the weight of the Communist Party and the strength of Communism in French society, of which the intellectual aspect, up until the eighties, this „French passion”, according to Marc Lazar. 5 The study of the French historiography of the pact consists in investigating the evolution of the place of the pact in scientific publications, the presentation of its contents, the motivations of the signees and the immediate consequences of such an agreement for Central Europe and for France … and notably for the Communists, who - in 1939 - represented in the Chamber of Deputies, the one elected in 1936, that of the Popular Front, a group of 74 elected members, the greatest number ever reached by the PCF (French Communist Party) since its founding, representing 12% of the total number of Deputies. The sources referred to consist in scientific publications on international relations, originating from the French University (from Pierre Renouvin, Jean- Baptiste Duroselle, René Girault, Robert Frank and Elisabeth du Réau), on Communism (among whom Stéphane Courtois, François Furet), and finally on the German-Soviet pact itself (Yves Santamaria in particular). 6 The various reprints of a same work (like Diplomatic History or History of International 5 LAZAR, Marc: Le communisme, une passion française. Perrin, Paris, 2002. JALABERT, Laurent: Le Grand Débat. Les universitaires français – historiens et géographes- et les pays communistes de 1945 à 1991. G.R.H.I., Toulouse, 2001. The French communist party was the first party of the left in Fance till 1978. 6 The bibliography is, from the latest to the present: DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste, Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours. Armand Colin, Paris, 1953. DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste (dir.): Les relations germano-soviétiques de 1933 à 1939. Armand Colin, Paris, 1954. DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste (dir.): Les frontières européennes de l’URSS 1917-1941, Cahiers de la FNSP, Armand Colin, Paris, 1957. RENOUVIN, Pierre. Histoire des relations internationales, tome 8, Les crises du XXe siècle. II-de 1929 à 1945. Hachette, Paris, 1958. BAUMONT, Maurice: La faillite de la paix (1918-1939), II- de l’affaire éthiopienne à la guerre (1936-1939). PUF, collection „ Peuples et civilisations ”, tome XX, Paris, 1961. BRUNET, Jean-Paul Brunet: art.cité, 1974. DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste: Politique étrangère de la France. La décadence (1932-1939). Imprimerie nationale, Paris, 1979. GIRAULT, René: art.cité, 1979. DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste: Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours. Dalloz, Paris, 1981. GIRAULT, René, FRANK, Robert: Histoire des relations internationales contemporaines, tome 2 : 1914-1941, Turbulente Europe et nouveaux mondes. Masson, Paris, 1988. FURET, François: Le passé d’une illusion. Essai sur l’idée communiste du XXe siècle. Robert Lafont-Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1995. COURTOIS, Stéphane (et alii): Le livre noir du communisme. Crimes, terreur, répression. Robert Laffont, Paris, 1997. SANTAMARIA, Yves: 1939, le pacte germano-soviétique. Editions Complexe, Bruxelles, 1998. DU RÉAU, Elisabeth: L’ordre mondial de Versailles à San Francisco juin 1919-juin 1945. PUF, Paris, 2007. COURTOIS, Stéphane: Ibidem, 2009. 24
Relations) are the focus of special attention in which each modification/change to the text (addition or editing) has to be closely examined. Our approach will consist first in investigating the analysis of the contents of the agreement between Ribbentrop and Molotov, then that of the origins of the pact, and finally, that of the significance of the event. The content of the „German-Soviet Pact”: from „agreement” to „alliance”, from „non-aggression” to „crime against peace”. The evolution of the designation of the the German-Soviet agreement is significant of the analysis historians have made of its content. During the fifties, quite neutral terms were used to designate the text signed on August 23, 1939 in Moscow by Ribbentrop and Molotov („treaty”, „agreement”, „pact”). The focus was on the content of the public document („non agression”) but the secret protocol (revealed in 1946 but only published by Russia in 1992) was already presented as a „much more important text” whose „existence was absoluteley indisputable” 7 . The second treaty signed September 28th, 1939 was presented more briefly and always separately. From the seventies on, both texts were thus linked and from then on, historians explain that „there was not simply one German-Soviet pact on August 23, 1939 but German-Soviet pacts, on August 23 and September 28, 1939” 8 This approach entails first the following consequence: the pacts cannot be considered as a „simple” circumstancial diplomatic or „neutrality” agreement but they establish an actual „alliance” between Germany and the USSR. In 1957, J.B. Duroselle and his team, concerning Soviet policy from August 23 on, explain that they can neither „be moral judges or even political ones of the Soviet attitude in these circumstances”, and they write: „Let’s simply say that it is perfectly coherent and that in the absence of any moral justification in the non-communist perspective of relations between states, it had strategic bases for justification. The June 1941 events are a testimony of particular significance.” (J.B. Duroselle). „It is perfectly normal that having signed a pact of non-agression with the Reich, the USSR had led a diplomatic game which was fair and necessary from its point of view in order not to ressucitate a state, a satellite of Germany, in this case the Polish state which had created so many problems for it since the first day of its founding and which in 1939, had been one of the main causes of the failure of the triad’s pact” (Benjamin Goriely) 9 . In 1979, René Girault insisted on the meaning of the pacts: „it was no longer a question of remaining at an equal distance between the two capitalist camps; it was a question of a real opportunity for 7 DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste: Histoire diplomatique…op.cit., 1953. 284. 8 GIRAULT, René: art.cité. 111. COURTOIS, Stephane and FURET, François also use the word „pacts” and not „pact”. 9 DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste : Les frontières…op.cit., 1957, XIII. et 284. 25
Page 2 and 3: ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
Page 5 and 6: Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
Page 7 and 8: CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
Page 9 and 10: Foreword The world remembers in 200
Page 11: The Historical Judgement of the Mol
Page 14 and 15: went often on emotional instead of
Page 16 and 17: What is much more interesting is th
Page 18 and 19: such an international agreement as
Page 20 and 21: Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
Page 22 and 23: Done in duplicate, in the German an
Page 25: Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
Page 29 and 30: Russian agreement (…) would allow
Page 31 and 32: Europe and on the French communists
Page 33 and 34: adopted a stance of denying the fac
Page 35 and 36: Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
Page 37 and 38: government (more than twenty) came,
Page 39 and 40: War. On the contrary, it shows that
Page 41 and 42: this anniversary and more widely of
Page 43: interesting: „Illusions. In summe
Page 47 and 48: Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
Page 49 and 50: One of the most influential associa
Page 51 and 52: Germanness in the provinces of West
Page 53 and 54: Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
Page 55 and 56: interwar period and the treaty was
Page 57 and 58: situation of rising danger accepted
Page 59 and 60: Manchukuo and broke relations with
Page 61: I would like to finish my article w
Page 64 and 65: party itself but for the whole Slov
Page 66 and 67: In summary, the group of the „Mod
Page 68 and 69: make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
Page 70 and 71: (Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
Page 72 and 73: have had a less serious effect on t
Page 74 and 75: not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78:
Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80:
individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82:
esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84:
expert of this matter 29 and had as
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Arendt on the contrary is in the op
Page 87 and 88:
the „matter”, where there was a
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adoption of the model it became cle
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of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93:
esistance […] but of logistics. N
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British government refused to give
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ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
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public doubt the democratic idea of
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Republicans. In the refugee camps i
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102
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iron? Where can one find more nicke
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According to his diaries, the main
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announced: „We have no active all
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110
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negative, an analysis of the disapp
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can let think of an imminent war po
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de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
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Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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120
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Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127:
Lets us skip a few decades and list
Page 128 and 129:
argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 130 and 131:
secret protocol clarified that the
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to reach out for Russia through the
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of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137:
At the same moment, we can note an
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Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
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war can still be avoided in June 19
Page 142 and 143:
acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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142
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agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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1939 between Germany and the Soviet
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Two ideas emerge from the press: on
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soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
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Moscow's line, with the national an
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154
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2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
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The Eastern Polish border was not r
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Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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162
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Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
Page 168 and 169:
could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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independence, Romania was forced to
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importance for the events considere
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possible future opposition to the S
Page 176 and 177:
ate of communists within the Jews o
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the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
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German Reactions A last point that
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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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