The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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Although in 1933 Little Entente institutionalised itself, there were lack of real cooperation and common goals, instead of protection against Hungarian revisionism. The main problems of the Little Entente was the territorial incoherence, border problems between Romania and Yugoslavia and rising pressure from three different powers: Germany on Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union on Romania and Italy on Yugoslavia. 4 An important country in Central Europe was definitely Poland, because of its size, geopolitical localisation between Germany and Soviet Union, economical and political impact on the other countries of the region. According to this and above-mentioned good relations Romania tried to win Poland over to a cause of antirevisionism and Little Entente. It did not come to realise because of well-grounded relations between Poland and Hungary. 5 The other reason is that Poland did not want to be engaged into regional cooperation project which was in fact very weak. Politicians from Poland had different projects, in which they would be able to establish the position of their country as the regional power and appear as one of the most significant European countries. Main project called Intermarium was pursued by Józef Piłsudski. He was willing to create a federation of central and eastern European nations as a counterweight to the Germany on west and Soviet Union on east. The federation leaded by Poland was to contain also: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. The project failed due to annexation of Belarus and Ukraine to the Soviet Union. Even though there was still and idea of federation in the narrow scope, but it was also denied by the bilateral conflicts which I mentioned at the beginning. This idea was later followed by Władysław Sikorski, who put forward the project of Central European Union and Józef Beck with his 'Third Europe' conception, but in fact both were far from realization. 6 Due to the failure of an organisation connecting all Central European countries, each of them concentrated on developing bilateral relations in the region and out of it. Poland after establishing its borders in the years 1918 - 1921 developed foreign policy. First international alliance treaties were signed with France in February 1921 and in the next month with Romania. I am going to present the alliance with France in detail later. Concerning alliance with Romania the treaty from March 1921 was mainly aimed against possible military action from the side of Russia. 7 This bilateral cooperation developed through the whole 4 Ibidem. 245-250, 266-280. 5 WILLAUME, Małgorzata: Rumunia. Trio, Warsaw, 2004. 127. 6 KORNAT, Marek: Realna koncepcja czy wizja ex post? Polska idea „Trzeciej Europy” (1937-1938). The website of Wyższa Szkoła Biznesu – National Louis University, http://politologia.wsb-nlu.edu.pl/uploadedFiles/file/M_Kornat - Realna koncepcja czy wizja ex post.pdf (date of usage: 20 March 2010). 7 DEMEL, Juliusz: Historia Rumunii. Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław, Warsaw, Cracow, Danzig, Łódź, 1986. 387. 52
interwar period and the treaty was renewed in 1926 and 1931. In the last one there was an additional regulation allowing both countries to organise military actions even before any aggression act and to cooperate also in case that the attack would be from the other side than Soviet Union. The only problem within this coalition was that Poland had also good relations with Hungary. As we can see the direction towards Poland was one of the most significant also for Romania, next to the Little Entente and alliance with France. But Romania needed also to look carefully on the southern direction and the possible Bulgarian revisionism. For strengthening the security in this region Romania signed in February 1934 a multilateral treaty with Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. This alliance was called the Balkan Entente. 8 For Hungary the priority was to get back the international recognition. It was happening gradually during the 20s and the first step was made in September 1922, when Hungary joined the League of Nations. Then in 1924 it signed a treaty with Soviet Union and in 1926 with Yugoslavia. Both were directed partly against Romania, because either Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had some territorial argues with this country. Hungary regained full sovereignty in 1927 when the League of Nations stopped controlling Hungarian military. After it Hungary engaged in a friendship with Italy, which had similar goals in Central Europe. These were weakening the Little Entente and moderating French influence in the region. In the following years Hungary signed also treaties with Poland (1928), Turkey (1929) and Austria (1931), what stabilized the situation of the country in the international society, apart from the territorial demands directed to Romania and Czechoslovakia. 9 Complicated situation of connotations between Central European countries, troubles with forming any regional organisations or cooperation projects and internal problems of each nation caused that the position of the region itself was very weak. The way of strengthening it was seen in the partnership with western countries. The main role was played by France, which created a kind of protectorate over Little Entente, but its main goal in Central Europe was formation of tripartite agreement with Czechoslovakia and Poland. During the conference in Locarno in October 1925 France signed two treaties: with Poland and with Czechoslovakia. These were to ensure both countries about French support in case of any aggression on the side of Germany. Despite this steps and a will towards a tripartite agreement France did not take into consideration the problem of Polish- Czechoslovak rivalry. These harsh relations were transferred to the rivalry over the main position in France's foreign politics in Central Europe. 10 As a result the agreement was not established and then in the late 20s, when the position of France weakened, it became less important for Central Europe. 8 DEMEL, Juliusz Demel: Historia Rumunii, op. cit. 387-388. 9 KOCHANOWSKI, Jerzy: Węgry. Od ugody do ugody 1867-1990. Trio, Warsaw, 1997. 79-80. 10 ESSEN, Andrzej: Polityka Czechosłowacji w Europie Środkowej w latach 1918-1932, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pedagogicznej, Cracow, 2006. 57-59. 53
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
Page 5 and 6: Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
Page 7 and 8: CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
Page 9 and 10: Foreword The world remembers in 200
Page 11: The Historical Judgement of the Mol
Page 14 and 15: went often on emotional instead of
Page 16 and 17: What is much more interesting is th
Page 18 and 19: such an international agreement as
Page 20 and 21: Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
Page 22 and 23: Done in duplicate, in the German an
Page 25 and 26: Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
Page 27 and 28: Relations) are the focus of special
Page 29 and 30: Russian agreement (…) would allow
Page 31 and 32: Europe and on the French communists
Page 33 and 34: adopted a stance of denying the fac
Page 35 and 36: Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
Page 37 and 38: government (more than twenty) came,
Page 39 and 40: War. On the contrary, it shows that
Page 41 and 42: this anniversary and more widely of
Page 43: interesting: „Illusions. In summe
Page 47 and 48: Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
Page 49 and 50: One of the most influential associa
Page 51 and 52: Germanness in the provinces of West
Page 53: Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
Page 57 and 58: situation of rising danger accepted
Page 59 and 60: Manchukuo and broke relations with
Page 61: I would like to finish my article w
Page 64 and 65: party itself but for the whole Slov
Page 66 and 67: In summary, the group of the „Mod
Page 68 and 69: make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
Page 70 and 71: (Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
Page 72 and 73: have had a less serious effect on t
Page 74 and 75: not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78: Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80: individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82: esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84: expert of this matter 29 and had as
Page 85 and 86: Arendt on the contrary is in the op
Page 87 and 88: the „matter”, where there was a
Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101: public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103: Republicans. In the refugee camps i
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102
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iron? Where can one find more nicke
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According to his diaries, the main
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announced: „We have no active all
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110
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negative, an analysis of the disapp
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can let think of an imminent war po
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de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
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Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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120
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Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
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Lets us skip a few decades and list
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argain with. Hitler had an offer th
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secret protocol clarified that the
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to reach out for Russia through the
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of a war interesting rather on civi
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At the same moment, we can note an
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Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
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war can still be avoided in June 19
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acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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142
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agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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1939 between Germany and the Soviet
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Two ideas emerge from the press: on
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soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
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Moscow's line, with the national an
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154
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2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
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The Eastern Polish border was not r
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Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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162
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Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
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could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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independence, Romania was forced to
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importance for the events considere
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possible future opposition to the S
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ate of communists within the Jews o
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the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
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German Reactions A last point that
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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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