The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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Unlike France Great Britain did not show any interest in Central Europe. Only when the danger of war rose in the late 30s and British interests around the world were invaded by Reich, Great Britain showed some interest in the matters of Europe, 11 what symptoms were guarantees given to Poland and Romania. One of the possible ways of strengthening national security of the newly founded states was the peace - oriented international society, with the League of Nations as its main representative. But although the League was working, it did not have any special impact on the international situation. The most significant agreements were negotiated between European powers. First important treaty was signed in Locarno in October 1925, when Germany guaranteed an inviolability of the borders with France and Belgium, but denied the possibility of signing analogous treaties with Czechoslovakia and Poland. This was the potential ground for German revisionism in Central Europe, and this showed that Central European countries could not be assured of the international support for their independence and self-governance. The hopes rose two years later when Aristide Briand, French foreign relations ministry, formed an initiative of a pact, in which countries would pledged themselves to abjure war. So called Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed in August 1928, but in was never of great importance, which was easily visible in the early 30s. The marginalization of Central European countries appeared again in 1933, when four European powers: France, Great Britain, Germany and Italy, worked on creating a forum of consulting their foreign policies. Finally it did not come to realize, but the proposal of establishing the Four-Power Pact including Germany, proved that western powers accepted the direct of political changes in this country and became a kind of encouragement for Hitler to keep developing his plans. 12 The problems of the relations with Germany, but also with Soviet Union, next to dealing with rising fascist movements appeared as key ones in the 30s. Poland signed a non-aggression pact with Soviet Union in July1932, but denied Soviet attempts to form a multilateral cooperation agreement in Central Europe and any possible military pacts. A year after Hitler came to power, in January 1934, Poland signed a non-violence declaration with Germany (known as Third Reich since 1933). Foreign affairs minister Józef Beck was realising the policy of equal distance between Warsaw from one side, Berlin and Moscow from another. At the turn of October 1938, just after Munich Agreement, which I will describe later, Poland used a critical situation of Czechoslovakia to regain a Cieszyn Silesia. This made an impression that Poland is an ally of Reich, which was far from true. In October 1938 and then at the special meeting in January 1939 Reich put forward demand of annexation Danzig and building an exterritorial motorway and railway to East Prussia. In exchange offered recognition of Polish borders and prolongation of a non-aggression declaration for the next 25 years. Poland disagreed and in the 11 ZINS, Henryk: Historia Anglii. Zakład Narodowy i. Ossolińskich, Wrocław, Warsaw, Cracow, 2001. 350-352. 12 Ibidem. 350. 54
situation of rising danger accepted British guarantees, what formally caused that Reich cancelled in April 1939 the above-mentioned declaration with Poland. In August 1939 it stopped trade exchange with Poland. 13 The situation of Czechoslovak relations with Soviet Union seemed to be good. The legal status of the communist party in this country meant for many foreigners that Czechoslovakia was a kind of a soviet satellite in Central Europe. Good relations were confirmed in May 1935, when Czechoslovakia signed a mutual help agreement (with the condition that firstly France, connected with both countries by similar agreements, would help the victim of an attack). On the other hand the relations with Reich were absolutely opposite. The problem concerned German minority in Czechoslovakia. In fact Germans lived in the certain part of the country close to the border with Germany and Austria. Generally this territory was called Sudetenland and Germans were in majority in this region. After the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938, which was not stopped by the western powers, despite the fact that the treaties signed after the World War I, had forbade uniting those countries, Czechoslovakia was surrounded by Reich. In April 1938 Hitler demanded Czechoslovak authorities to give the autonomy to the Germans. Czechoslovakia asked western powers for arbitral decision, believing that they would support it, due to the solidarity of democratic countries. However the arguments given by Hitler convinced French and British diplomats suggested Czechoslovakia to make concessions to Reich. This fact, in addition to lack of reaction after the Anschluss, convinced Hitler, that western powers tried to protect the general stability in Europe rather than took care of small states in Central Europe. He put forward a demand to annex Sudetenland to Reich, which was rejected. As a result in the end of September 1938 in Munich took place a conference and the powers in the Munich Agreement accepted the demand of Reich. At the following day Poland regained Cieszyn Silesia. In the following months the weakened Czechoslovak authorities agreed to give autonomy to Slovakia and Carpathian Ruthenia and then were forced to accept the arbitral decision of Reich and Italy about moving borders with Hungary and Poland. The critical moment came in March 1939 when Hitler demanded independence declaration from Slovakia in exchange for holding back Hungary from military action in Ruthenia. Formally independent Slovakia was proclaimed at 14 March 1939 and in the following two weeks newly founded state signed a protection agreement with Reich. At 15 March 1939 Reich took control over Czech and created the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Despite the former declaration of holding back the Hungarian military forces, Hitler did not react to Hungarian occupation in Carpathian Ruthenia. Czechoslovakia did not longer exist as an independent country. 14 13 KUPIECKI, Robert, SZCZEPANIK, Krzysztof: Polityka zagraniczna Polski 1918-1994. Warsaw, 1995. 30-33. 14 HEIMANN, Mary: Czechoslovakia. The state that failed, Yale University Press, New Haven-London, 2009. 75-110. 55
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
Page 5 and 6: Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
Page 7 and 8: CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
Page 9 and 10: Foreword The world remembers in 200
Page 11: The Historical Judgement of the Mol
Page 14 and 15: went often on emotional instead of
Page 16 and 17: What is much more interesting is th
Page 18 and 19: such an international agreement as
Page 20 and 21: Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
Page 22 and 23: Done in duplicate, in the German an
Page 25 and 26: Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
Page 27 and 28: Relations) are the focus of special
Page 29 and 30: Russian agreement (…) would allow
Page 31 and 32: Europe and on the French communists
Page 33 and 34: adopted a stance of denying the fac
Page 35 and 36: Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
Page 37 and 38: government (more than twenty) came,
Page 39 and 40: War. On the contrary, it shows that
Page 41 and 42: this anniversary and more widely of
Page 43: interesting: „Illusions. In summe
Page 47 and 48: Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
Page 49 and 50: One of the most influential associa
Page 51 and 52: Germanness in the provinces of West
Page 53 and 54: Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
Page 55: interwar period and the treaty was
Page 59 and 60: Manchukuo and broke relations with
Page 61: I would like to finish my article w
Page 64 and 65: party itself but for the whole Slov
Page 66 and 67: In summary, the group of the „Mod
Page 68 and 69: make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
Page 70 and 71: (Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
Page 72 and 73: have had a less serious effect on t
Page 74 and 75: not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78: Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80: individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82: esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84: expert of this matter 29 and had as
Page 85 and 86: Arendt on the contrary is in the op
Page 87 and 88: the „matter”, where there was a
Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101: public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103: Republicans. In the refugee camps i
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iron? Where can one find more nicke
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According to his diaries, the main
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announced: „We have no active all
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110
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negative, an analysis of the disapp
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can let think of an imminent war po
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de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
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Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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120
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Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
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Lets us skip a few decades and list
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argain with. Hitler had an offer th
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secret protocol clarified that the
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to reach out for Russia through the
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of a war interesting rather on civi
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At the same moment, we can note an
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Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
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war can still be avoided in June 19
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acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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142
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agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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1939 between Germany and the Soviet
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Two ideas emerge from the press: on
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soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
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Moscow's line, with the national an
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154
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2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
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The Eastern Polish border was not r
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Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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162
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Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
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could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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independence, Romania was forced to
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importance for the events considere
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possible future opposition to the S
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ate of communists within the Jews o
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the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
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German Reactions A last point that
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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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