The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

More documents

Recommendations

Info

negative, an analysis of the disappearance of the French MPs from the public stage about the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. It is seems use for this to take into account the few month previous to the signature of German-Soviet pact in order to analyse in a global way the perception of the MPs of the European situation. This brief flashback makes us to understand better the reactions rather the absence of reactions of the MPs facing diplomatic Uturn, an agreement for the war. 4 Yet, the MPs eventually take hold the subject but not in analysis way; they take it as a pretext for internal quarrels. The pact is no longer the subject of the debate, it is a political excuse. „Croquemitaine se dégonflera?” 5 A political analysis of the international situation by the French MPs We think it is pertinent here to carry out a flashback of a few months, one year at the most, in order to understand which was the MPs frame of mind facing an alarming European situation and thus to seize a global political analysis. Still marked by the First World War throes, the French society, and its elected representatives, is largely crossed by anxious tensions around the macabre memories of the trenches. The French still have under the eyes the scares, almost indelible for this generation, felt by the war on the French social body and on France in general. As many wounds which did not know the cicatrisation. 6 In fact, the desire of peace is a major feeling, almost daily, of the French, relayed at the national level by their MPs who do not escape the rule. Chamberlain develops in Munich the „gentleman agreement” with a strong idea of conservation of peace and Daladier presents the agreement as least bad of the compromises in order to safeguarding France. 7 However is it necessary to present the parliamentary body like a soft entity will stop at nothing to preserve peace or suffering from a political blindness facing the rise of perils? Certainly not. And if its international perception is erroneous - we will see why - it is necessary to bring a nuance to the MPs blindness about this subject. Thus, not very obvious in the text, that is much more in the substance of Daladier’s speech, it acts to temporize, save time in order to be able to make 4 DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste: Politique étrangère de la France. La décadence. 1932-1939. Seuil, Paris, 1979. 5 th CLAUDEL, Paul in Le Figaro, August 18 1939, quoted in DUROSELLE, Jean-Baptiste, op. cit., 1979. 6 On psychological impact of the Fist World war on the French society, to see: AUDOIN- ROUZEAU, Stéphane: 14-18. Les combats des tranchées. Armand Colin, Paris, 1986. and of the same autor: L'enfant de l'ennemi. 1914-1918. Aubier, Paris, 1995. and SANTAMARIA, Yves: Le pacifisme, une passion française. Armand Colin, Paris, 2005. These autors explain how the extreme violence of this conflict radiated in the society and which were the consequences. 7 DU RÉAU, Elisabeth: L'ordre mondial de Versailles à San Francisco, juin 1919 – juin 1945. PUF, Paris, 2007. 112
safe Europe, a part to say the least, by the means a Franco-British rapprochement way and a rhythmic development of armament of the two states. Objective is not to oppose in a frontally way to the fascistic policies but to make a counterweight by intimidation. It should be stressed that one speaks about rapprochement, it is not question about alliance yet. The year 1939 is year of the realization of the Front of Peace around Franco-British alliance which aims „étudier les perspectives d'actions communes dans l'hypothèse d'une guerre longue” 8 . How to understand this wing? Let us study a significant case, that of the Radical Party, 9 which informs us on the phenomenon. Between the end of 1938 and the beginning of 1939 the militants and especially radical elected representatives decide in favour of the firmness way facing Hitler. The frank stances of Daladier which counteract the Italian claims to the French colonial empire collect the party assent, and the one of a great majority of the political world. The way of firmness is here in preparation and the decisive reversal carry out at the time of the parliamentary session of March 17 th 1939, two days after Hitler’s trick in Czechoslovakia. For the radical MPs, followed by a very great number of their colleagues of different political sensibilities, German offensive is intolerable. The tone of the debates lets sting a hardening will of the French policy toward Germany. 10 The Radical Party approves the speech of Daladier, made on March 29 th 1939, an „énergique fin de non recevoir aux propositions de conversation de Mussolini” 11 and expression of the French resolution wildly opposite to any new overthrow in Europe. The evolution is clear from Munich: the delaying, the French MPs passed to assertion of European safety by hard policy expression vis-à-vis the German chancellor who cannot be held any more, with his government, like a confidence interlocutor. In the governance and in the negotiation, the tone is resistance. In this context is developing and finalizing the Front of Peace to the West but in the governments and MPs mind, clearly affirm the necessity of an enlarging of the Front to the East in order to weaken and to contain hitlerian expansionist slightest sign. USSR affirms itself as obvious ally around the Polish question. In spite of the unquestionable antagonism between Soviet ideology and those of the various parties present at the National Assembly, excepted the PCF (French Communist Party), national interest precedes and the negotiations are committed in objective to lead in a short time to a three-party alliance enclosing the Third Reich. Thus the policy toward Germany hardens alliances are reflected and unit starts to be done behind the Nation. It establishes a context characteristic of international very high voltages which 8 DU RÉAU, Elisabeth: op. cit., 2007. 9 BERSTEIN, Serge: Histoire du Parti radical. Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris, 1982. 10 JODRF, Mach 18 th 1939. 11 BERSTEIN, Serge: op. cit., 1982. 113
Page 2 and 3:
ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
Page 5 and 6:
Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
Page 7 and 8:
CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
Page 9 and 10:
Foreword The world remembers in 200
Page 11:
The Historical Judgement of the Mol
Page 14 and 15:
went often on emotional instead of
Page 16 and 17:
What is much more interesting is th
Page 18 and 19:
such an international agreement as
Page 20 and 21:
Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
Page 22 and 23:
Done in duplicate, in the German an
Page 25 and 26:
Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
Page 27 and 28:
Relations) are the focus of special
Page 29 and 30:
Russian agreement (…) would allow
Page 31 and 32:
Europe and on the French communists
Page 33 and 34:
adopted a stance of denying the fac
Page 35 and 36:
Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
Page 37 and 38:
government (more than twenty) came,
Page 39 and 40:
War. On the contrary, it shows that
Page 41 and 42:
this anniversary and more widely of
Page 43:
interesting: „Illusions. In summe
Page 47 and 48:
Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
Page 49 and 50:
One of the most influential associa
Page 51 and 52:
Germanness in the provinces of West
Page 53 and 54:
Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
Page 55 and 56:
interwar period and the treaty was
Page 57 and 58:
situation of rising danger accepted
Page 59 and 60:
Manchukuo and broke relations with
Page 61:
I would like to finish my article w
Page 64 and 65: party itself but for the whole Slov
Page 66 and 67: In summary, the group of the „Mod
Page 68 and 69: make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
Page 70 and 71: (Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
Page 72 and 73: have had a less serious effect on t
Page 74 and 75: not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78: Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80: individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82: esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84: expert of this matter 29 and had as
Page 85 and 86: Arendt on the contrary is in the op
Page 87 and 88: the „matter”, where there was a
Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101: public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103: Republicans. In the refugee camps i
Page 104 and 105: 102
Page 106 and 107: iron? Where can one find more nicke
Page 108 and 109: According to his diaries, the main
Page 110 and 111: announced: „We have no active all
Page 112 and 113: 110
Page 116 and 117: can let think of an imminent war po
Page 118 and 119: de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
Page 120 and 121: Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
Page 122 and 123: 120
Page 124 and 125: Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127: Lets us skip a few decades and list
Page 128 and 129: argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 130 and 131: secret protocol clarified that the
Page 132 and 133: to reach out for Russia through the
Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137: At the same moment, we can note an
Page 138 and 139: Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
Page 140 and 141: war can still be avoided in June 19
Page 142 and 143: acked by a „belligerent” coalit
Page 144 and 145: 142
Page 146 and 147: agreement” sound anachronistic. E
Page 148 and 149: 1939 between Germany and the Soviet
Page 150 and 151: Two ideas emerge from the press: on
Page 152 and 153: soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
Page 154 and 155: Moscow's line, with the national an
Page 156 and 157: 154
Page 158 and 159: 2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
Page 160 and 161: The Eastern Polish border was not r
Page 162 and 163: Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
Page 164 and 165:
162
Page 166 and 167:
Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
Page 168 and 169:
could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
Page 170 and 171:
independence, Romania was forced to
Page 172 and 173:
importance for the events considere
Page 174 and 175:
possible future opposition to the S
Page 176 and 177:
ate of communists within the Jews o
Page 178 and 179:
the initial positive feeling toward
Page 180 and 181:
wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
Page 182 and 183:
German Reactions A last point that
Page 184:
182
show all

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?