The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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According to his diaries, the main reason of Ribbentrop’s attitude was anger with Hungarian attempts of imperial policy 13 . In January 1939 at the closed meeting with German generals he presented his vision of the future fate of Ukraine. He said: „The Ukrainian question allows us coup de grace of Poland as well as the USSR to be inflicted. Taking everything into consideration, we can carry on implementing the ideological purpose of our eastern policy, which is to create „Great Ukraine” consisting of all ethnographic Ukrainian territories in the USSR, Poland and Transcarpathia. (…) Obviously, this country will survive only thanks to unconditional devotion to Germany. The division of Poland and the USSR will result in the augmentation of our activity in the east and finally make us to rule according to the maxim „divide et impera”. We are aware that the first step to bring it off is „Carpatho-Ukraine” 14 . It’s worth mentioning that Ribbentrop’s conception was characterized by variation of the famous Alfred Rosenberg’s idea. Rosenberg, in the 1940s head of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, observed that the Soviet Union was not a monolithic state, but rather a conglomerate of many small nations. He suggested that Germany should appeal to the non-Russian nationalities’ quest for freedom, arguing that such an appeal would reduce the force of Soviet resistance. There is the mistaken impression that Rosenberg as well as Ribbentrop acted in opposition to Hitler. Ihor Kamenetsky rightly mentioned, that „in reality, there is not a substantial difference in their attitudes and actions regarding German Lebensraum” 15 . The ultimate goal of all of them was to make Ukraine to be subordinated to Germany on the one hand and to adapt eastern territories to the needs of German colonists on the other. The Carpatho-Ukrainian experiment lasted only five months and even proclamation of independence in a symbolic gesture of Voloshyn did not stop Hungarian annexation of that territory in March 1939. There are at least three reasons of its failure: 1. Firstly, there was absolutely no support from Western powers. France and England as well as the Soviet Union declared desinteressment. Furthermore, it was not just Hungary who has ordered territorial changes. Carpatho-Ukraine had to struggle with Polish objections, too. Both Poland and 13 On 28th October, 1938 Ciano noted in his diary: „Ribbentrop’s attitude is hostile towards Hungary, whereas Czechs are unashamedly supported by him”, and Italian minister has in mind the Carpathian issue itself. In November Ciano described negotiations between Italy and Germany, which eventually resulted in First Vienna Award. The Italians advocated Hungary which strongly requested a recapture of Carpathian Ruthenia, whereas the Germans, represented by Ribbentrop, sought to tone down Hungarians’ pretensions. CIANO, Galeazzo: Dziennik 1937- 1943. Edited by T. WITUCH. Pułtusk, 2006. 258. 14 TORECZKI, Roman: Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933-1945). Warszawa, 1972. 161-162. 15 KAMENETSKY, I.: German Colonization Plans In Ukraine during World War I and II. In: TORKE, Hans-Joachim, HIMKA, John-Paul (ed.): German-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective. Toronto, 1994. 101. 106
Hungary sought to set up a common border and additionally Polish government remonstrated with the recruiting Ukrainian nationalist politicians prosecuted in Poland in Carpatho-Ukraine administration. 16 2. Secondly, at least since the death of Yevhen Konovalets in March 1938 there was a deep division within Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the main independence movement in Ukraine. Therefore, some politicians expressed their skepticism about special role of Carpatho-Ukraine, while others, the young ones, joined the Carpathian Sich en masse. 3. And thirdly – the most important thing – the German view. It was Hitler who approved Hungarian annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine. What did happen with the project of „Great Ukraine” 17 ? Faced with two rival plans, Hungarian and Ukrainian, Hitler’s approach was to say yes to the stronger one. Hungary, at least since the time that Bela Imredy was appointed prime minister, has belonged to the closest allies of Germany. Thus far they had consented to German economic penetration and – what probably was decisive – on 24 th February 1939, a month before an invasion, they joined the Anti-Comintern Pact. Moreover, it’s pointless to pretend that Hitler or anybody from his tight inner circle was a slavophile; as a matter of fact day after crash of Carpatho- Ukraine Hitler intimated president of Czechoslovakia Emil Hacha into accepting the German occupation of the Czech rump state. Yet in this case, the idea of „Great Ukraine” – and Ribbentrop must have known it – was exaggerated and inconceivably in winter 1938/1939. Questions of Galicia, Volhynia and the Soviet part of Ukraine must have been left unanswered, because plans of any territorial changes of Poland and – notably – the Soviet Union at that moment would go too far. What were the consequences for German-Ukrainian relations of failure of Carpatho-Ukraine? Although the episode served as a graphic illustration of how little Ukrainians could depend on the goodwill of Hitler, he was continuously reported to be deliverance by many politicians in Ukraine. It was Hungary and Poland that in their opinion bore all the blame for the decline of Carpatho-Ukraine. In April 1939 Andrij Melnyk, a leader of the OUN, 16 PAGEL, J.: Polska i Związek Radziecki w czasie kryzysu czechosłowackiego (marzec-październik 1938). In: SIERPOWSKI, Stanisław (ed.): Niemcy w polityce międzynarodowej 1919-1939. Tom III- W dobie Monachium. Poznań, 1992. 343. Hungary was also afraid of the Ukrainian nationalist politicians, see more: MARUZSA, Zoltán: A meg nem valósult területi gyarapodás. Német-magyar diplomáciai tárgyalások Magyarország terjeszkedéséről a Keleti-Kárpátokon túl 1941-42 folyamán. 403-415. pp. In: Eszmék, forradalmak, háborúk. Vadász Sándor 80 éves. Szerk.: Háda Béla, Ligeti Dávid, Majoros István, Maruzsa Zoltán, Merényi Krisztina, Petneházi Margit. ELTE BTK Új- és Jelenkori Egyetemes Történeti Tanszék, Budapest, 2010. 17 It’s worth mentioning that project of „Great Ukraine” was not openly supported by authorities of Carpatho-Ukraine. On the contrary, Voloshyn stressed that his main aim is to maintain good relations with neighbouring countries and he rather opted for „organic work” within Carpatho-Ukraine. GRELKA, Frank: Polityka III Rzeszy wobec ukraińskich zmagań niepodległościowych w latach 1934-1941. In: Biuletyn Ukrainoznawczy, 12/2006. 66. 107
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
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Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
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Done in duplicate, in the German an
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Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
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Relations) are the focus of special
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Russian agreement (…) would allow
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Europe and on the French communists
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adopted a stance of denying the fac
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Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
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government (more than twenty) came,
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War. On the contrary, it shows that
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this anniversary and more widely of
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interesting: „Illusions. In summe
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Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
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One of the most influential associa
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Germanness in the provinces of West
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Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
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interwar period and the treaty was
Page 57 and 58: situation of rising danger accepted
Page 59 and 60: Manchukuo and broke relations with
Page 61: I would like to finish my article w
Page 64 and 65: party itself but for the whole Slov
Page 66 and 67: In summary, the group of the „Mod
Page 68 and 69: make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
Page 70 and 71: (Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
Page 72 and 73: have had a less serious effect on t
Page 74 and 75: not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78: Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80: individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82: esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84: expert of this matter 29 and had as
Page 85 and 86: Arendt on the contrary is in the op
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Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
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Page 102 and 103: Republicans. In the refugee camps i
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Page 106 and 107: iron? Where can one find more nicke
Page 110 and 111: announced: „We have no active all
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Page 114 and 115: negative, an analysis of the disapp
Page 116 and 117: can let think of an imminent war po
Page 118 and 119: de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
Page 120 and 121: Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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Page 124 and 125: Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127: Lets us skip a few decades and list
Page 128 and 129: argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 130 and 131: secret protocol clarified that the
Page 132 and 133: to reach out for Russia through the
Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137: At the same moment, we can note an
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Page 140 and 141: war can still be avoided in June 19
Page 142 and 143: acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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Page 146 and 147: agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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Page 150 and 151: Two ideas emerge from the press: on
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2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
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The Eastern Polish border was not r
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Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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162
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Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
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could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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independence, Romania was forced to
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importance for the events considere
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possible future opposition to the S
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ate of communists within the Jews o
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the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
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German Reactions A last point that
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