The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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Party), the enemy of the inside. Of course the remarks violence varies according to the political edge but overall the anti-communist campaign is unanimous and virulent. On the right and the extreme right, nothing is surprising, antagonism is already old but occasion is blessed to destroy French Communist Party. On the left, the report is not hardy better because attitude answers same logics and if arguments differ about tone and nature, the required result is the same one: to make disappear the French Communist Party. To the left, the report is hardly better because the attitude answers the same logics and if the arguments differ from tone and from nature, the popular profit is the same : remove the PCF. In the SFIO, divergent opinions were: Blum debate with Cachin but he disapproves of the suspension of L'Humanité and expresses his embarrassment, shaken by the contradictions between his spokesman's post of the party and his personal convictions. But in spite his person, the Blum’s moderation does not make unanimity and within the SFIO the tone is the condemnation without reserve of which Paul Faure is made the example: „Douze balles dans la peau des complices de Hitler! D'accord.” 27 The question of the pact meets itself even in the internal debates of the parties when are in confrontation the various currents. At the radicals no more that somewhere else we know the reflex of union in front of capsizing of Moscou. 28 Jeanneney, president of the Senate, advises Daladier, figure of the party and the president of Council, to part from Georges Bonnet, radical and Foreign Secretary. For Jeanneney, it is a question of getting rid of a disruptive element, often free electron, which persists in opposing to the policy of firmness of the government after the signature of the pact. At also raises in house problem because its pacifist vision of the international situation supported by the right wing of the party arises in contradiction with the majority ideology of firmness developed by the left current of the radicals which knew since March 1939 that it was necessary „indéniablement se préparer à la guerre” 29 - although we can strongly qualify such an assertion. Finally, the French Communist Party remains a specific case because its attitude seems „constituer, politiquement, un suicide” 30 when, at the moment when all the French political life projectors are directed on it, align on the Stalin’s policy and deploys an argument arsenal which dismays all the political world. In spite of the pact signature, which however catches on the wrong-foot all communist engagements, the French Communist Party does not vary and align, locked in an ideological rationality which must prevent all divergent 27 Quoted by BERSTEIN, Serge. Léon Blum. Paris, 2006. 28 BERSTEIN, Serge: Histoire du Parti radical. Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris, 1982. 29 ZAY, Jean: Carnets secrets. 1942. 30 Remarks made by SADOUL, Jacques, an important figure ot the PCF, in a letter addressed on August 26 th to the senator of the Seine, Marcel Cachin, quoted by CRÉMIEUX-BRILHAC, Jean-Louis: Les Français de l'An 40, Tome 1: La guerre oui ou non?. Gallimard, Paris, 1990. 118
interpretations of the political way enacted by Moscow and which could contravene the Stalin’s wills. „L'URSS reste un "modèle", le pilier du mouvement ouvrier révolutionnaire ” for the French Communist Party. 31 Not a silence but a whispering, Ribbentrop-Molotov pact does not set MPs attention. It has created, it is true, a few reactions but they remain isolated and come from shy MPs who did not make them heard. 32 This major event that the press clearly identify as a fundamental change of international situation and a diplomatic reorganisation to the detriment of France, only provoke slight of opposition of Commission with no reaction thus common response and discipline in the Hemicycle. Would did be what the elected of the Nation is able to do facing the terrible pact announcement ? Of course not. Expression of the reaction toward of the German-Soviet pact signature is ingreaved in dynamic where time is getting quicker. From this stupefaction, which is the reason of a false interpretation of international situation, which makes the MPs speechless, nothing emerge of it. It was not event been the subject of a limited reflexion on the date following this announcement, come the position of the Communists, and this too good opportunity to lay waste to the French Communist Party. Finally, in such a short time, in which itch day something important happened, the subject of the pact leave the interest, marked by the strong „districtism” characteristic of the Third Republic elected representatives and by internal quarrels which find in this troubled context a fertilised grown. 33 As quickly as it is negotiated between Germans and Russians, the pact has been a topic for the French MPs. Even if it is a warmonger, he has been acquitted quickly. 31 CRÉMIEUX-BRILHAC, Jean-Louis: op. cit., 1990. 32 Within PCF in particular, the pact made debate until the cause final threats and departures: Renaud Jean, president of the communist parliamentary group to the House puts his reisgnation in the balance, on Renaud Jean to see: BELLOIN, Gérard: Renaud Jean, le tribun des paysans. Paris, 1993. On the other hand, two deputies of the Dordogne cross the step and leave the party: it acts ot Saussot and Paul Loubradou, on Paul Loubradou to see: BOURGEOIS, Guillaume: Paul Loubradou, un communiste rebelle. Arkheia, 2008. 39-53. 33 For a regional study of the impact of the perception of the German-Soviet pact, to see: RICHAUD, Romain Richaud: Les réactions politiques d'un département de gauche au pacte Ribbentrop-Molotov:les Landes and ITHURBURU, Caroline: Les réactions politiques d'un département de droite au pacte Ribbentrop-Molotov:les Basses-Pyrénées, communications (published in this book) at the international conference, Ribbentrop – Molotov pact August 1939 and this European effects at ELTE, Budapest, December 3 th and 5 th 2009. 119
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
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Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
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Done in duplicate, in the German an
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Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
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Relations) are the focus of special
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Russian agreement (…) would allow
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Europe and on the French communists
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adopted a stance of denying the fac
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Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
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government (more than twenty) came,
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War. On the contrary, it shows that
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this anniversary and more widely of
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interesting: „Illusions. In summe
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Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
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One of the most influential associa
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Germanness in the provinces of West
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Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
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interwar period and the treaty was
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situation of rising danger accepted
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Manchukuo and broke relations with
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I would like to finish my article w
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party itself but for the whole Slov
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In summary, the group of the „Mod
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make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
Page 70 and 71: (Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
Page 72 and 73: have had a less serious effect on t
Page 74 and 75: not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78: Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80: individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82: esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84: expert of this matter 29 and had as
Page 85 and 86: Arendt on the contrary is in the op
Page 87 and 88: the „matter”, where there was a
Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101: public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103: Republicans. In the refugee camps i
Page 104 and 105: 102
Page 106 and 107: iron? Where can one find more nicke
Page 108 and 109: According to his diaries, the main
Page 110 and 111: announced: „We have no active all
Page 112 and 113: 110
Page 114 and 115: negative, an analysis of the disapp
Page 116 and 117: can let think of an imminent war po
Page 118 and 119: de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
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Page 124 and 125: Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127: Lets us skip a few decades and list
Page 128 and 129: argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 130 and 131: secret protocol clarified that the
Page 132 and 133: to reach out for Russia through the
Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137: At the same moment, we can note an
Page 138 and 139: Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
Page 140 and 141: war can still be avoided in June 19
Page 142 and 143: acked by a „belligerent” coalit
Page 144 and 145: 142
Page 146 and 147: agreement” sound anachronistic. E
Page 148 and 149: 1939 between Germany and the Soviet
Page 150 and 151: Two ideas emerge from the press: on
Page 152 and 153: soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
Page 154 and 155: Moscow's line, with the national an
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Page 158 and 159: 2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
Page 160 and 161: The Eastern Polish border was not r
Page 162 and 163: Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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Page 166 and 167: Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
Page 168 and 169: could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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independence, Romania was forced to
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importance for the events considere
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possible future opposition to the S
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ate of communists within the Jews o
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the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
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German Reactions A last point that
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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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