The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál
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atrocities were not the reason but the initial for the riots and pogroms. <strong>The</strong> powervacuum<br />
opened the possibility to let loose of grieve and hatred against the weakest<br />
part of society, Jews were eagerly accepted as scapegoats altogether. Jews were not<br />
haunted because people found the victims‘ bodies. <strong>The</strong>se findings were on the one<br />
hand taken as an explanation for the riots - the association of Jews and Soviets - on<br />
the other hand one must not underestimate the motivation drawn by the Germans‘<br />
expected arrival. <strong>The</strong> discovering of the NKVD‘s victims was the occasion rather<br />
than the reason for the pogroms in the summer of 1941.<br />
<strong>The</strong> anticipation of German wishes<br />
Richard Overy remarks that the riots would never have taken place had they<br />
not been encouraged by German propaganda that denounced Jews as nothumans,<br />
as vermin that could and should be destroyed. 50 It is quite possible that<br />
news about the Germans‘ treating of the Jews in the Western parts of former<br />
Poland had reached people in the Eastern regions and that they knew that<br />
violence against Jews would be in favour of the Germans. 51<br />
Ben Shepherd and again Richard Overy are eager to explain that the population<br />
in former Eastern Poland had as well a reason to hate the Soviets and to see the<br />
Germans as liberators from their yoke as they were careful in regard to things that<br />
may come as they could not know what the Germans‘ regime would bring. 52 Many<br />
Ukrainians took sides with the Germans and in trying to act in their interest they<br />
saw pogroms as a favourable means. 53 As Martin Dean shows, no-one had to<br />
cooperate with the German units when they first arrived. Those who volunteered to<br />
do so had their reasons and power and gain were not least. 54<br />
<strong>The</strong> German armies‘ approach was a motivation to parts of the population to<br />
unleash their anger independently, but as soon as the Germans had arrived they<br />
took over control. This is especially important in cases where no corpses were<br />
found but riots occurred anyway. As Dieter Pohl states: Besides some villages,<br />
the pogroms can not bee seen as spontaneous uprisings but as planned action<br />
by German units. But it were local actors who played the active part. 55<br />
50 OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 224.<br />
51 GROSS, Jan T.: Revolution from Abroad - <strong>The</strong> Soviet conquest of Poland‘s Western<br />
Ukraine and Western Belorussia. Princeton, 2002. 231. and 60.<br />
52 SHEPHERD, Ben: War in the Wild East - <strong>The</strong> German army and Soviet partisans.<br />
Cambridge, 2004. 60. OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei<br />
Hamburg, 2003. 138.<br />
53 POHL, Dieter: Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944 -<br />
Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens. München, 1996. 47.<br />
54 DEAN, Martin: <strong>The</strong> ‚Local Police‘ in Nazi-occupied Belarus and Ukraine as the ‚Ideal<br />
Type‘ of Collaboration - in Practice, in the Recollection of its Members and in the Verdicts of the<br />
Courts. In: TAUBER, Joachim (Ed.): ‚Kollaboration‘ in Nordosteuropa - Erscheinungsformen<br />
und Deutungen im 20. Jahrhundert. Wiesbaden, 2006. 422.<br />
55 POHL, Dieter: Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941-1944 -<br />
Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens. München, 1996. 66.<br />
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