The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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war can still be avoided in June 1939. The Prague coup in March, followed by Albania’s invasion in April, caused a shift in public opinion. In September 1939, mobilisation takes place without any protest. Reflecting public opinion, the press now campaigns against a new Munich. From left to right, they unanimously condemn „Stalin’s betrayal”: Albert Bayet writes an editorial in L’Oeuvre of 27 August called „Do not ask us to excuse the inexcusable”. In L’Époque, Henri de Kérillis castigates „the USSR’s stab in the back”. Numerous political formations and trade unions, outraged by the German- Soviet Pact, join this alliance and swell the ranks of the pro-war majority. This is the case, on the right, of the nationalists of Colonel François de La Rocque’s Parti social français (French social Party) and the Fédération républicaine (Republican Federation) of Louis Marin and Philippe Henriot. On the one hand, the anticommunists are less tempted to perceive Nazi Germany as a line of defence against bolshevism, while on the other the supporters of a tough stand towards Germany are not seen to be following Moscow’s orders. Rightwing pacifism loses its credibility due to the PCF’s troublesome support of the pacifist side. The left wing experiences a similar phenomenon. The Pact convinces many pacifists to stop initiating actions in favour of peace so as not to disrupt the atmosphere of national union as well as to distance themselves from the communists. Thus, the vast majority of the Geneva movement is not resolved to an outright peace. This is why Théodore Ruyssen sends a telegram to Edouard Daladier, president of the Council, in September to assure him of his support. As soon as the Pact is signed, the communists are driven out of the Universal peace Congress (RUP), while the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT, Federation of Trade Unions) breaks away from the PCF the day after the meeting of the German and Soviet armies in Brest-Litovsk on 18 September 1939. The SFIO’s situation is more original: on 29 th August, an agenda criticising the German-Soviet Pact is voted. However, behind this apparent unity, the Pact actually confirms the two positions which divide its beliefs. Integral pacifists (Faure and Pivert positions), comfortable with their anticommunism, want peace at all costs, on the grounds that a war against Germany would benefit the USSR. Pacifism is therefore only represented by tiny minorities: on the extreme right-wing, the headline of newspaper Je suis partout! of 1 September 1939 is À bas la guerre, vive la France! (No to war, long live France). Maurras and Daudet’s pacifism is fuelled by hope of defeating the Republican regime. On the left wing, the SFIO’s integral pacifists are joined by a group of former Briand supporters favouring the motto „neither right nor left”. Among those are members of left-wing fringe groups such as Marcel Déat or Gaston Bergery, advocating a rapprochement with Germany as part of a federal Europe. Thus, the pamphlet entitled Paix immédiate (Peace now), written on 25 August 1939 by libertarian pacifist Louis Lecoin, bears, alongside the signatures of philosopher Alain, writer Jean Giono and Victor Margueritte, 138
those of Déat, Pivert, Zoretti (a supporter of Paul Faure) and Challaye, an ultrapacifist member of the League for human Rights. The pacifist influence on French society in the late 1930s fails to survive the march to war. Prefectural reports highlight the renewed strength of patriotism from the summer of 1939. However, the PCF’s shift has caused the dispersion of the pacifist group 6 . By specifically targeting the communists, the Daladier government succeeds in marginalising the pacifists during the first weeks of war. Muzzled pacifism: the government’s action Despite its decline since the spring of 1939, the pacifist movement, which had impregnated political circles, retained supporters within the circles of power. „The peace party” is a heterogeneous entity recruiting from the right wing: MP Scapini, close to the leagues, Pierre-Etienne Flandin, head of the Alliance démocratique, as well as left wing: Eugène Frot, Paule Faure or René Brunet. This small minority attempts to organise itself into a parliamentary liaison Committee involving fifteen MPs and twelve senators. It benefits however from solid support in both Foreign Affairs committees, headed by radical socialist personalities who have supported the pacifist cause: Henry Bérenger in the Senate and Jean Mistler in the Chamber (Mistler, imbued with visceral pacifism linked to the trauma of World War I, was a cultural attaché for the French legation in Hungary and taught at the university of Budapest). The pacifist movement manifests itself repeatedly and launches several initiatives. At the end of August and during the parliamentary session of 2 September 1939, its members closest to the fascists – Bergery, Déat or Pierre Laval – attempt to promote Mussolini’s proposition of another peace conference. Relying on the World War I precedent, others demand that a secret committee meeting be convened to debate possible peace conditions. The German peace propositions, at the end of September, are another opportunity to make their voice heard. Even before the signing of the German-Soviet Pact, parliamentary pacifists can count on the support of radical Georges Bonnet, minister of Foreign Affairs since April 1939. During the Cabinet meeting of 24 August 1939, Bonnet claims that the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact does not have to lead to war. He sets out to convince the president of the Council, Daladier, of the importance of examining the final peace options. Georges Bonnet, backed by Anatole de Monzie, minister of Public Works, also plays the Mussolini card for a new Munich. During the next Cabinet meeting on 31 August, he tries again to gain his colleagues’ support for the italian proposition. However, his last-ditch diplomatic effort comes up against Edouard Daladier’s firm stance this time, 6 On this question see VAISSE, M.: Le pacifisme français des années trente. In: Relations internationales, n 53 (1988), 50. See also VAISSE, M. (ed.): Le pacifisme en Europe des années 1920 aux années 1950. Bruxelles, 1993. 139
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
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Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
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Done in duplicate, in the German an
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Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
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Relations) are the focus of special
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Russian agreement (…) would allow
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Europe and on the French communists
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adopted a stance of denying the fac
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Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
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government (more than twenty) came,
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War. On the contrary, it shows that
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this anniversary and more widely of
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interesting: „Illusions. In summe
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Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
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One of the most influential associa
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Germanness in the provinces of West
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Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
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interwar period and the treaty was
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situation of rising danger accepted
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Manchukuo and broke relations with
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I would like to finish my article w
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party itself but for the whole Slov
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In summary, the group of the „Mod
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make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
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(Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
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have had a less serious effect on t
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not expect strong resistance and ho
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Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
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individual offenders, 10 who used h
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esearch. But how could the suppress
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expert of this matter 29 and had as
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Arendt on the contrary is in the op
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the „matter”, where there was a
Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101: public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103: Republicans. In the refugee camps i
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Page 106 and 107: iron? Where can one find more nicke
Page 108 and 109: According to his diaries, the main
Page 110 and 111: announced: „We have no active all
Page 112 and 113: 110
Page 114 and 115: negative, an analysis of the disapp
Page 116 and 117: can let think of an imminent war po
Page 118 and 119: de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
Page 120 and 121: Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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Page 124 and 125: Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127: Lets us skip a few decades and list
Page 128 and 129: argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 130 and 131: secret protocol clarified that the
Page 132 and 133: to reach out for Russia through the
Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137: At the same moment, we can note an
Page 138 and 139: Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
Page 142 and 143: acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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Page 146 and 147: agreement” sound anachronistic. E
Page 148 and 149: 1939 between Germany and the Soviet
Page 150 and 151: Two ideas emerge from the press: on
Page 152 and 153: soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
Page 154 and 155: Moscow's line, with the national an
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Page 158 and 159: 2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
Page 160 and 161: The Eastern Polish border was not r
Page 162 and 163: Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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Page 166 and 167: Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
Page 168 and 169: could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
Page 170 and 171: independence, Romania was forced to
Page 172 and 173: importance for the events considere
Page 174 and 175: possible future opposition to the S
Page 176 and 177: ate of communists within the Jews o
Page 178 and 179: the initial positive feeling toward
Page 180 and 181: wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
Page 182 and 183: German Reactions A last point that
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