The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál
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announced: „We have no active allies on the world, apart from Germany. <strong>The</strong>y<br />
are against all our occupants” 18 . Indeed, Germany was described as the lesser<br />
of two evils, because they were not an occupant on the one hand and were not<br />
acquainted with the Soviet Union on the other. Moreover, the common priority<br />
of Ukrainian and German policy, which was a revision of the order of<br />
Versailles, remained current.<br />
Surprisingly, groups affected by pro-German orientation did not doubt even<br />
after the <strong>Molotov</strong>-<strong>Ribbentrop</strong> <strong>Pact</strong>. Though, for others that was a sight that<br />
redefinition of policy needs to be done. <strong>The</strong> growing resistance against official<br />
statement of the OUN executives subsequently was exemplified by the OUN’s<br />
split into two parts in 1940, with the older more moderate members supporting<br />
Melnyk and the younger and more radical supporting Stepan Bandera. But total<br />
rejection of hopes connected with the German intervention was quite<br />
unrealistic; when on 17 th September 1939 Soviet army started an invasion of<br />
Poland, for Ukraine it meant not only long-anticipated unification of Ukrainian<br />
territory, but also – soon after – it resulted in Soviet political and economic<br />
repressions. Hence, the myth of the Germans as some kind of liberators had<br />
maintained until German army came to Ukraine in 1941 and implemented their<br />
own prosecutions.<br />
18<br />
TORECZKI, Roman: Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy (1933-1945).<br />
Warszawa, 1972. 182.<br />
108