The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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importance for the events considered here. Further developments in Germanoccupied Poland and Eastern Europe, especially the Holocaust, would be too big a topic for this paper. I will first take a look back on the two years of occupation in either part of the former Polish Republic, before analysing possible reasons for the pogroms in the summer of 1941. The Hitler-Stalin-Pact The Hitler-Stalin-Pakt‘s ultimate goal, as the secret additions show, was to destroy the Polish state, which had only been established in the course of remodelling Europe after World War I. 3 The Germans had - ever since the treaty of Versailles - lamented the loss of land and people and, in Beata Kosmala‘s words: To revise the new borderlines was of the highest priority to all parties during the inter-war years. 4 The Soviet Union too had lost territories in the wake of WWI, but also had to deal with additional losses after the Soviet-Polish war of 1921. 5 Nevertheless - the Polish government felt save in its position between two political opponents, who would - as the Poles hoped - never find a common ground and would never unite against Poland. It was the ever harsher German rhetoric during 1939 that caused Great Britain and France to assure Poland of their assistance in case the Germans would dare to announce war. Both countries had been negotiating with the Soviet government about some kind of alliance, but they did not show much earnest and the Soviet leadership reached out for a more eager partner. 6 When the Reich showed interest in a non-aggression treaty, it was a matter of days before it would be signed on the 23rd August 1939 by von Ribbentrop and Molotov respectively. There are various explanations for this sudden change of policy of which Geoffrey Roberts‘ can be taken as a good example; he sums up: Stalin did not want to start a war in 1939, but feared that he would be an easy victim and thus engaged in the dangerous alliance with Hitler. 7 3 Secret additions to the treaty of 1939 („Geheimes Zusatzprotokoll zum Deutsch- Sowjetischen Nichtangriffsvertrag”), 23rd August 1939, cited from http://mdzx.bibbvb.de/cocoon/1000dok/dok_0025_pak.html?object=translation&lang=de, 19.3.2009. 4 KOSMALA, Beata: Der deutsche Überfall auf Polen - Vorgeschichte und Kampfhandlungen. In: BORODZIEJ, Wlodzimierz (Ed.): Deutsch-polnische Beziehungen 1939 - 1945 - 1949 - Eine Einführung. Osnabrück, 2000. 21. 5 OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 26. 6 OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 79-87. 7 ROBERTS, Geoffrey: Stalins Kriege - Vom Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zum Kalten Krieg. Düsseldorf, 2008. 51. See also 45-63, and OVERY, Richard: Russlands Krieg - 1941-1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 2003. 87-92. Soviet Foreign Affairs 1939: O‘SULLIVAN, Donald: „Je später man uns um Hilfe bittet, desto teurer wird man sie uns bezahlen” - Die sowjetische Außenpolitik zwischen dem Münchner Abkommen und dem 22. Juni 1941, in: THOMAS, Ludmilla und KNOLL, Viktor (Ed.): Zwischen Tradition und Revolution - Determinanten und Strukturen sowjetischer Außenpolitik 1917-1941. Stuttgart, 2000. 157-203. 170
The attack on Poland World War II started, when the Reich attacked Poland on the 1 st September 1939, immediately followed by Great Britain‘s and France‘s announcement of war against Germany in favour of Poland. While the Wehrmacht marched through Poland in a couple of days, the Soviet leadership hesitated and attacked the country only when asked to do so by their German allies from September 17th on. By September 28 th the whole of Poland was occupied and therefore could be divided according to the secretly defined boarders. The German as well as the Soviet military leadership immediately started to form an administration. There was no more talk about a possibly independent state of Poland. 8 The German occupation of Western Poland The Western areas of former Poland, occupied by the Germans were divided into different administrative zones. The once German regions were incorporated into the Reich as so-called Reichsgaue, while the Polish core-land became the Generalgouvernement für die besetzten polnischen Gebiete. While building a civil administration, it was the German Einsatzgruppen‘s task to control and persecute the Polish people. The Einsatzgruppen were linked to regular Wehrmacht units and were ordered to fight against partisans, to stop resistance of any kind and to evict political opponents. They could use all means necessary and they did so when hunting down the Polish elite and Jews. 9 The Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland. The Red Army as liberator As did their German ally, the Soviet leadership was eager to incorporate the newly claimed areas, starting with a radical change of their social structure. Geoffrey Roberts summarises the economical actions taken and also mentions, that the main target of Soviet intervention was the Polish minority in predominantly White Russian and Ukrainian areas, as they were seen as a 8 MERRIDALE, Catherine: Iwans Krieg - Die Rote Armee 1939-1945. Frankfurt am Main, 2008. 89. German-Soviet treaty of friendship („Deutsch-Sowjetischer Grenz- und Freundschaftsvertrag”), 28th September 1939, cited from http://mdzx.bibbvb.de/cocoon/1000dok/dok_0027_gre.html?object=translation&lang=de 19.3.2009. 9 The Einsatzgruppen‘s order can be seen in the so-called „Kommissarbefehl”: Richtlinien des OKW vom 6. Juni 1941 für die Verfolgung und Liquidierung politischer Funktionäre („Kommissarbefehl”). In: Europa unterm Hakenkreuz - Die faschistische Okkupationspolitik in den zeitweise besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion (1941-1944). Berlin, 1991. 145. See POHL, Dieter: Der Völkermord an den Juden. In: BORODZIEJ, 115. For the cooperation between Wehrmacht and Einsatzgruppen see OLDENBURG, Manfred: Ideologie und militärisches Kalkül-Die Besatzungspolitik der Wehrmacht in der Sowjetunion 1942. Köln, 2004. 39-49. and ANGRICK, Andrej: Besatzungspolitik und Massenmord-Die Einsatzgruppe D in der südlichen Sowjetunion. Hamburg, 2003. 64-68. 128. 171
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ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
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Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
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CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
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Foreword The world remembers in 200
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The Historical Judgement of the Mol
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went often on emotional instead of
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What is much more interesting is th
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such an international agreement as
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Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
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Done in duplicate, in the German an
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Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
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Relations) are the focus of special
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Russian agreement (…) would allow
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Europe and on the French communists
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adopted a stance of denying the fac
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Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
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government (more than twenty) came,
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War. On the contrary, it shows that
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this anniversary and more widely of
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interesting: „Illusions. In summe
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Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
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One of the most influential associa
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Germanness in the provinces of West
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Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
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interwar period and the treaty was
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situation of rising danger accepted
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Manchukuo and broke relations with
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I would like to finish my article w
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party itself but for the whole Slov
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In summary, the group of the „Mod
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make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
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(Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
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have had a less serious effect on t
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not expect strong resistance and ho
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Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
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individual offenders, 10 who used h
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esearch. But how could the suppress
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expert of this matter 29 and had as
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Arendt on the contrary is in the op
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the „matter”, where there was a
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adoption of the model it became cle
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of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
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esistance […] but of logistics. N
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British government refused to give
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ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
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public doubt the democratic idea of
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Republicans. In the refugee camps i
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102
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iron? Where can one find more nicke
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According to his diaries, the main
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announced: „We have no active all
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110
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negative, an analysis of the disapp
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can let think of an imminent war po
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de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
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Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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Page 124 and 125: Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127: Lets us skip a few decades and list
Page 128 and 129: argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 130 and 131: secret protocol clarified that the
Page 132 and 133: to reach out for Russia through the
Page 134 and 135: of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137: At the same moment, we can note an
Page 138 and 139: Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
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Page 142 and 143: acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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Page 146 and 147: agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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Page 150 and 151: Two ideas emerge from the press: on
Page 152 and 153: soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
Page 154 and 155: Moscow's line, with the national an
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Page 158 and 159: 2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
Page 160 and 161: The Eastern Polish border was not r
Page 162 and 163: Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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Page 166 and 167: Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
Page 168 and 169: could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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Page 176 and 177: ate of communists within the Jews o
Page 178 and 179: the initial positive feeling toward
Page 180 and 181: wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
Page 182 and 183: German Reactions A last point that
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