The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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The Polish Minority in Prussia and the German Empire In 1871 6,2% of the German population in the Empire were of Polish nationality. Most lived in the eastern provinces of Prussia. The Polish minority was especially represented in the areas gained by the Partition of Poland at the end of the 18 th century: the provinces of Poznań and West-Prussia. Around the city of Poznań Polish-speaking inhabitants constituted the majority of the population. After the congress of Vienna (1815) the Poles enjoyed a relatively autonomous status in the dynastical state of Prussia. Poznań was constituted as a Grand Duchy with certain rights to self-governance until the November uprising of 1830. 4 After that the Poles experienced a growing pressure to assimilate, at first motivated by policies to strengthen the integrity of the Prussian state. But Prussian authorities also launched a growing ethnically and culturally motivated assimilation campaign towards the Polish population, mainly aiming at the cultural attributes of language and religion. 5 With the foundation of the German Empire in 1871 the Polish minority experienced a dramatic change of environment. The new Empire claimed to be a nation-state by denying the existence rights of minorities within its borders. The first measures were restrictions in the use of the Polish language in schools and public meetings. In the Cultural Dispute (Kulturkampf) around 1872, the government repressed the influence of the catholic church in the public sphere. The Poles were especially affected, since many Polish-speaking priests who worked as teachers were now replaced by German-speaking civil servants and teachers. 6 This process of anti- Polish measures by the Prussian government marks the beginning of the attacks against the Polish cultural identity within the German Empire, also known as the campaign of Germanisation. The Pan-German League and its ideology The repressive policies of the Prussian government in the last third of the 19 th century were not satisfying to big parts of the German nationalistic middle and upper class. Wide circles organized themselves into political interest groups, promoting an ethnically and culturally homogeneous state. They demanded the full integration and assimilation of minorities, including the liquidation of their identity. 7 4 MAKOWSKI, Krzysztof: Polen, Deutsche und Juden und die preußische Politik im Großherzogtum Posen. Versuch einer neuen Sicht. In: HAHN-KUNZE (ed.): Nationale Minderheiten und staatliche Minderheitenpolitik in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert. Berlin, 1999. 51-60. 5 ALEXANDER, Manfred: Kleine Geschichte Polens. Bonn, 2005 (first: Stuttgart, 2003.). 246. 6 TRZECIAKOWSKI, Lech: The Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland. New York, 1990 (first Polish: Kulturkampf w zaborze pruskim. Poznań, 1970). 5. 7 HERING, Rainer: Konstruierte Nation. Der Alldeutsche Verband 1890 bis 1939. Hamburg, 2003. 443. 46
One of the most influential associations was the Pan-German League, founded in 1891. The League was dominated by a nationalistic, racist and growing anti-Semitic ideology. Before the First World War the League was relatively small with 22,000 members. Nevertheless, the organization could exercise influence through its exclusive members in high societal positions and close ties with the government and local administrations. The Pan-Germans advocated territorial expansion of the German Empire on the continent and overseas, as well as strengthening naval forces and protecting German culture among German emigrants living abroad. One of the League’s main aims was to promote Germanisation of minorities like the French population in Alsace- Lorraine, the Danish population in Schleswig and the Polish in Prussia. The last case received the most attention with a promotional campaign for the settlement of German farmers on former Polish land in the eastern provinces. Specialized in agitating this point was the German Eastern Marches Society (Deutscher Ostmarkenverein), founded in 1894 and operated closely with the Pan-Germans. Both organizations lobbied the Prussian government intensively for an anti-Polish settlement policy. 8 In 1885 the Prussian government founded the Royal Settlement Commission in Poznań. Its mission was to buy and distribute Polish owned land among German colonists. The financial intervention of the state into the real estate market caused an exceptional increase in land price. This supported the conservation of traditional aristocratic ownership, but had little effect on population development. Increasingly people left these areas seeking better employment in the prosperous industrial west. The German-speaking population in the province of Poznań between 1871 and 1905 dropped from 43% to 38%. 9 For the Polish population the hostile state intervention was a big threat. To protect their cultural identity and territorial position they used the constitutional rights that they enjoyed as German citizens. Polish organizations founded private societies for education, publishing newspapers and especially building financial institutes to buy German and abandoned land for distribution among Poles. The Polish members of the German parliament condemned the hostile activities of the nationalistic agitation groups and the Prussian government. The majority of the conservative and national liberal parties supported the restrictive policies toward the Poles. These turbulent circumstances led to a poisoning of Polish-German relations and an alienation of the Poles towards the German authorities. 10 8 WEHLER, Hans-Ulrich: Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918. Vol. 9 (=LEUSCHER, Joachim (edit.): Deutsche Geschichte). 6th edition. Göttingen, 1988. 93. 9 KOEHL, Robert Lewis: Colonialism inside Germany 1886-1918. In: The Journal of Modern History. Vol. 25, No. 3. Chicago 1953. 255-272. and BROSZAT, Martin: Zweihundert Jahre deutsche Polenpolitik. Frankfurt am Main, 1972. (first: München, 1963). 155. 10 GOSEWINKEL, Dieter: Einbürgern und Ausschließen. Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Göttingen, 2001. 217. 47
Page 2 and 3: ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
Page 5 and 6: Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
Page 7 and 8: CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
Page 9 and 10: Foreword The world remembers in 200
Page 11: The Historical Judgement of the Mol
Page 14 and 15: went often on emotional instead of
Page 16 and 17: What is much more interesting is th
Page 18 and 19: such an international agreement as
Page 20 and 21: Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
Page 22 and 23: Done in duplicate, in the German an
Page 25 and 26: Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
Page 27 and 28: Relations) are the focus of special
Page 29 and 30: Russian agreement (…) would allow
Page 31 and 32: Europe and on the French communists
Page 33 and 34: adopted a stance of denying the fac
Page 35 and 36: Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
Page 37 and 38: government (more than twenty) came,
Page 39 and 40: War. On the contrary, it shows that
Page 41 and 42: this anniversary and more widely of
Page 43: interesting: „Illusions. In summe
Page 47: Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
Page 51 and 52: Germanness in the provinces of West
Page 53 and 54: Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The syste
Page 55 and 56: interwar period and the treaty was
Page 57 and 58: situation of rising danger accepted
Page 59 and 60: Manchukuo and broke relations with
Page 61: I would like to finish my article w
Page 64 and 65: party itself but for the whole Slov
Page 66 and 67: In summary, the group of the „Mod
Page 68 and 69: make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
Page 70 and 71: (Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
Page 72 and 73: have had a less serious effect on t
Page 74 and 75: not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78: Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80: individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82: esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84: expert of this matter 29 and had as
Page 85 and 86: Arendt on the contrary is in the op
Page 87 and 88: the „matter”, where there was a
Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99:
ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101:
public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103:
Republicans. In the refugee camps i
Page 104 and 105:
102
Page 106 and 107:
iron? Where can one find more nicke
Page 108 and 109:
According to his diaries, the main
Page 110 and 111:
announced: „We have no active all
Page 112 and 113:
110
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negative, an analysis of the disapp
Page 116 and 117:
can let think of an imminent war po
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de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
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Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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120
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Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127:
Lets us skip a few decades and list
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argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 130 and 131:
secret protocol clarified that the
Page 132 and 133:
to reach out for Russia through the
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of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137:
At the same moment, we can note an
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Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
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war can still be avoided in June 19
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acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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142
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agreement” sound anachronistic. E
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1939 between Germany and the Soviet
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Two ideas emerge from the press: on
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soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
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Moscow's line, with the national an
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154
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2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
Page 160 and 161:
The Eastern Polish border was not r
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Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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162
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Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
Page 168 and 169:
could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
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independence, Romania was forced to
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importance for the events considere
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possible future opposition to the S
Page 176 and 177:
ate of communists within the Jews o
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the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
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German Reactions A last point that
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182
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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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