The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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The positioning of German-Polish relations during the inner-German conflict before 1914 influenced significantly the foreign political relations between the German Weimar (First) Republic and the Polish Second Republic. The prejudices and stereotypes continued of Poles as people of a lower culture, incapable of maintaining their own state. As a result, the Weimar Republic negotiated a border treaty with France but never with Poland. Even the honoree of the Nobel peace prize of 1926, the German foreign minister Gustav Stresemann, ran an aggressive foreign policy campaign against the independent Poland. Despite the above developments, it would be careless to expand an argument based on „historical traditions” of Polonophobia. There may indeed be an ideological development from the German-Polish conflict before the First World War to the foreign policy of the Weimar Republic, and then to the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact of 1939, but that does not imply a logical line. History is never predetermined. For example, how do we locate in that line the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934, which led to a significant weakening of the Polish-Western European alliance? Political decisions do not always operate in a linear way. But however the historical experiences of the early 20 th century might have influenced German politics, the Polonophobic stereotypes existing among the German public provided a receptive ground for the Nazi regime before the invasion of Poland and during its subsequent occupation and demolition. 50
Prętkiewicz, Przemysław The system of international connections by Central European countries on the eve of the outbreak of war The result of the World War I in Central Europe was the sudden appear of national countries, some of which did not have any or had just a short tradition of statehood. Those countries needed to form their international connections and arrange relations, especially with neighbourhood states. The only country which existed before the Great War was Hungary, although within the Dual Monarchy it was not the fully independent state. However because of the process of mapping out the borders even Hungary seemed to be newly founded state. Long period of existence within multiethnic empires caused that there were many areas with great variety of nations. These areas and also the ones which historically had belonged to some of them became a bone of contention. At the beginning we need to know what the basic relations between Central European countries were. Already aforementioned Hungary was potentially the biggest threat for the stabilisation in the region after the War. Its revisionism aimed in the territory of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia since 1929). Only Poland had at that time good relations with Hungary, which was the effect of common historical fight for independence. 1 At that time Poland had a border conflict in Cieszyn Silesia with Czechoslovakia, which opposed these countries. Similar problems affected on the relations with Lithuania, where there was a problem of supremacy over Vilnius. Thanks to the military and political cooperation after the Great War Poland created good relations with Romania. 2 To protect themselves from Hungarian revisionism which I have already mentioned Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia signed an agreement in July 1920. One year later similar treaties where established between those countries and Romania - with Czechoslovakia in April 1921, with Yugoslavia in June 1921. What is more the agreement between Romania and Yugoslavia had an additional reason, which was the potential Bulgarian revisionism in the areas of Macedonia and Dobruja. 3 This system of connections was known as the Little Entente, although it was not the formal name. However the cooperation between these three countries was not going well. The problems which spoiled it were territorial incoherence and different powerful neighbours - for Czechoslovakia it was Germany, for Romania - Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (part of Soviet Union since 1922) and for Yugoslavia - Italy. 1 Own notes from the remembrance meeting dedicated to Polish refugees during the World War II in the Ipel’ valley, Conference Center of Polish Armed Forces, 19 March 2010. 2 WILLAUME, Małgorzata: Rumunia. Trio, Warsaw, 2004. 126. 3 ESSEN, Andrzej: Polityka Czechosłowacji w Europie Środkowej w latach 1918-1932, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Akademii Pedagogicznej, Cracow, 2006. 64-65. 51
Page 2 and 3: ISBN 978-963-284-164-9
Page 5 and 6: Unknown Clauses: The Background Dea
Page 7 and 8: CONTENTS Foreword (István MAJOROS,
Page 9 and 10: Foreword The world remembers in 200
Page 11: The Historical Judgement of the Mol
Page 14 and 15: went often on emotional instead of
Page 16 and 17: What is much more interesting is th
Page 18 and 19: such an international agreement as
Page 20 and 21: Text of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggress
Page 22 and 23: Done in duplicate, in the German an
Page 25 and 26: Lachaise, Bernard Historiography of
Page 27 and 28: Relations) are the focus of special
Page 29 and 30: Russian agreement (…) would allow
Page 31 and 32: Europe and on the French communists
Page 33 and 34: adopted a stance of denying the fac
Page 35 and 36: Ortolan, Guillaume The 70 th annive
Page 37 and 38: government (more than twenty) came,
Page 39 and 40: War. On the contrary, it shows that
Page 41 and 42: this anniversary and more widely of
Page 43: interesting: „Illusions. In summe
Page 47 and 48: Kretschmann, Vasco The ideological
Page 49 and 50: One of the most influential associa
Page 51: Germanness in the provinces of West
Page 55 and 56: interwar period and the treaty was
Page 57 and 58: situation of rising danger accepted
Page 59 and 60: Manchukuo and broke relations with
Page 61: I would like to finish my article w
Page 64 and 65: party itself but for the whole Slov
Page 66 and 67: In summary, the group of the „Mod
Page 68 and 69: make proposals or suggestions. 6 In
Page 70 and 71: (Aland), Hanko and the islands of t
Page 72 and 73: have had a less serious effect on t
Page 74 and 75: not expect strong resistance and ho
Page 77 and 78: Winkler, Paul Adolf Eichmann’s Vi
Page 79 and 80: individual offenders, 10 who used h
Page 81 and 82: esearch. But how could the suppress
Page 83 and 84: expert of this matter 29 and had as
Page 85 and 86: Arendt on the contrary is in the op
Page 87 and 88: the „matter”, where there was a
Page 89 and 90: adoption of the model it became cle
Page 91 and 92: of Eichmann. For that Heydrich deli
Page 93: esistance […] but of logistics. N
Page 96 and 97: British government refused to give
Page 98 and 99: ole in the defence of Madrid in Nov
Page 100 and 101: public doubt the democratic idea of
Page 102 and 103:
Republicans. In the refugee camps i
Page 104 and 105:
102
Page 106 and 107:
iron? Where can one find more nicke
Page 108 and 109:
According to his diaries, the main
Page 110 and 111:
announced: „We have no active all
Page 112 and 113:
110
Page 114 and 115:
negative, an analysis of the disapp
Page 116 and 117:
can let think of an imminent war po
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de la guerre [il] ne fait que l'agg
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Party), the enemy of the inside. Of
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120
Page 124 and 125:
Before the Pact M. Coulondre, the F
Page 126 and 127:
Lets us skip a few decades and list
Page 128 and 129:
argain with. Hitler had an offer th
Page 130 and 131:
secret protocol clarified that the
Page 132 and 133:
to reach out for Russia through the
Page 134 and 135:
of a war interesting rather on civi
Page 136 and 137:
At the same moment, we can note an
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Faure 2 , remains hostile to war. I
Page 140 and 141:
war can still be avoided in June 19
Page 142 and 143:
acked by a „belligerent” coalit
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142
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agreement” sound anachronistic. E
Page 148 and 149:
1939 between Germany and the Soviet
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Two ideas emerge from the press: on
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soviets didn’t have motive. Blum
Page 154 and 155:
Moscow's line, with the national an
Page 156 and 157:
154
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2.000 German speaking inhabitants).
Page 160 and 161:
The Eastern Polish border was not r
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Army. The mayor of Lviv did not wan
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162
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Budapest, and for Warsaw. The two c
Page 168 and 169:
could not destroy the Polish Air Fo
Page 170 and 171:
independence, Romania was forced to
Page 172 and 173:
importance for the events considere
Page 174 and 175:
possible future opposition to the S
Page 176 and 177:
ate of communists within the Jews o
Page 178 and 179:
the initial positive feeling toward
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wanted to take revenge for the NKVD
Page 182 and 183:
German Reactions A last point that
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182
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The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - ELTE BTK Történelem Szakos Portál

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