Programska knjižica - Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo

Sometimes, it is hard to distinguish the cause from effect. Particularly if we try
to analyse Bošković’s complex nature, often melancholic, suspicious and vehement
at times in the light of his skilful communication and brilliant display
of erudition in high society.
Key words: Ruđer Bošković, science communication, De Solis ac Lunae defectibus
SREĆKO KOVAČ
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia /
Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska
INDUCTION, ABDUCTION AND JUSTIFICATIONS
IN BOŠKOVIĆ
Bošković’s method of induction is analyzed primarily on the basis of the
texts in De continuitatis lege (1754, nr. 134–135), Theoria philosophiae naturalis
(1763, nr. 40–41), and in Supplementa and Adnotationes in Benedikt
Stay, Philosophiae recentioris… libri decem, vol. 1 (1755). First, we analyze
in what sense “Bošković’s induction“ includes abduction as its integral part.
Not only should a large number of cases confirm the proposed (natural) law,
but the explanation of seemingly contradictory facts should also be given in
the face of the proposed law. Furthermore, the law itself should satisfy some
special constraints in order to make it appropriate as an explanation of the
observed facts as well as to make it applicable to unobservable objects (for
the abductive component in Bošković’s induction see Festini 1989 and Čuljak
1998; for Bošković’s theory of induction see e.g. Hunter 1965, Carrier 1974,
Škarica 2000, 2004).
Further, it is shown that a typology of justifications (evidences and reasons)
plays a significant role in Bošković’s conception of induction (abduction
included). Notably, Bošković distinguishes between strong evidence, phenomenal
(prima fronte) evidence and inductive justification, and combines them to a
specific (non-recursive) procedure of inductive-abductive reasoning.
Finally, we analyze justifications contained in Bošković’s inductive reasoning
from the standpoint of contemporary justification logic. Justification
logic was first developed for the reasoning about arithmetical proofs (Artemov
1995) and then as a refinement of epistemic logic in general (Fitting 2004). In
order to formalize Bošković’s theory of induction the justification logic should
be extended to comprise Bošković’s typology of justifications and to include
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