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agreed Constitution. Seemingly Clark's knowledge and support was given contrary
to considered opinion at the Foreign Office in London. The current President of the
Republic, Glafkos Clerides who drafted the 13 amendments, has gone on record as
saying that Makarios showed him the draft v/ith suggested altérations added in Sir
Arthur Clarke's handwriting 23 . Clerides said that Clarke told him that lie had given
advice to Makarios on this matter as a personal friend. President Makarios justified
the move as eliminating divisive elements in the constitution: "certain unreasonable
rights the misuse of which creates obstacles to the smooth running of the state" 24 .
He distanced himself from the subséquent violence which he publicly considered to
be the acts of extremists and irregulars. Turkish-Cypriots saw it as an attempt to
relegate them from a position of partnership to the status of a minority. When they
refused to accept the constitutional amendments as a fait accompli, they saw the
violence as a means of removing them entirely. 25
The December 1963 constitutional crisis and the re-occurrence of communal
violence saw the beginning of a rigid separate economic development on the island.
Turkish-Cypriot government employees withdrew en masse (only médical staff,
23 Kyle K. 1984. Cyprus. London: Minority Rights Group, p.22, footnote 12.
u Cyprus Mail, 26/10/1963.
25 As these events are still controversial, it is worth re-quoting two conflicting explanations at some
lengtli as a health warning (originally quoted by Robert McDonald [McDonald R. 1989. The
Problem of Cyprus. London: International Institute of Strategie Studies, Adelphi Papers No. 234,
note 25 to Chp. 1] ): Field Marshall Lord Carver, Commander of the Peace Force wrote in
[Koumoulides J. (ed.) 1986. Cyprus in Transition. London: Trigraph, p.22] that "botli sides had
armed bodies of men ready to go into action immediately... the Turks had a plan which they
executed, to leave ail government service, and try and set up a parallel administration... at the same
time abandoning a number of mixed and isolated villages [103 according to Turkish-Cypriot sources]
and concentrating their population in areas where they were less vulnerable; and... the Greeks had
plans which they executed with brutality and callous disregard of human life, to drive Turks out of
certain areas, particularly in the northern suburbs of Nicosia..." Whereas Robert Stephens has argued
[Stephens R. 1966. Cyprus: A Place of Arms. London: Pali Mall, p. 101] that "neither the suggestion
of a carefully planned Turkish rebellion nor that of a systematic Greek attempt at extermination or
terror will bear close examination. Despite their clandestine activities, both sides were ill-prepared
militarily or politically when the clash came. Nor had either side taken the elementary précautions
which should have been evident if they had been preparing for battle, such as the remo val of their
compatriots from unsafe areas. It was not until the fighting had begun that the Turks began to move
out of some of the mixed villages and to concentrate in the Nicosia area, either voluntarily or from
fear, or in some cases, under pressure from the Turkish leadership. The same is true of the Greek
évacuation from areas where they were outnumbered and in danger".
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