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able to spearhead a revival aided, (rather than dominated) by government. Even if
aid was significarli, as is argued by Turkish-Cypriot scholars, it does not appear to
have been entirely squandered. Government and the activities of quasi-public sector
institutions (the Co-operative sector, the Church and in the Turkish-Cypriot case,
Evkaf) may have also acted to restore confidence, but confidence in the relative
security of investment is worth little if there is no private sector to invest in.
Perhaps the sole "analysis of national level economic data and policy" will not
satisfactorily "provide the missing link" in the search for "the catalyst [which]
stimulated a demand led recovery" as Zetter suggests. 60
Understanding the
mechanism by which economic activity was reactivated after the hostilities of 1974,
needs to be deeper if dues as to which policies were successful, and why, are to be
understood. Essentially the single catalyst will always be elusive; not the
construction industry, manufacturing or tourism, but a combination of events which
were seized upon, consciously or unconsciously, and turned into modernisation and
the concentration of more resources on higher value added occupations. This latter
Zetter saw, understood and was brave enough to share; this, his contribution in the
context of Cyprus, is immense.
The location of a Turkish-Cypriot revival
Zetter argued that the Greek-Cypriot economy recovered due to the state's support
of the construction industry. This has been questioned above with some evidence
seeming to indicate that employment and exports from the manufacturing sector
were more important to the recovery there. Meanwhile Turkish-Cypriot planners
concentrated their attention on agriculture, and export agriculture in particular.
60 Zetter 1992. op. cit., pp.8,10.
262