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territorial adjustments, regional security and, in the context of the Cyprus dispute,
the political winners) lost out economically, significantly and consistently.
Disparities in the conditioning factors north and south seem to offer a partial
explanation for the relatively poor per capita performance of the Turkish-Cypriot
economy. However, the main reasons seem to be its de facto absorption into the
Turkish economy; adopting Turkish currency, monetary policy, therefore inflation
rates, high inward migration from Turkey and consequently, slow growth in per
capita income. Seemingly, more research is needed to apply some meat to these
bare bone conclusions.
As a policy tool in line with international attempts to find a unitary solution to the
Cyprus dispute, these results make less than reassuring reading. Whilst they imply
that Turkish-Cypriots could have gained from making more concessions to achieve a
unitary outcome (had such attempts been met by reciprocal sincerity), ironically 67
this prospect could be undermined by being unlikely to provide Greek-Cypriots with
much, if any, economic benefit. The rough projections above however, neither
confirm nor deny conclusively that a single island economy would perform better
than the combined performance of two non-communicating ones. Long run
economic growth in Cyprus as a whole, did not appear to have been adversely
affected by significant and lasting political upheavals, perhaps even the reverse. So
economic reintegration may not have been as large an economic benefit as
politically inspired, multi-lateral agency reports have implied 68 .
67 It is ironie because Greek Cypriot rhetoric tends to call for the re-unification of the island while
Turkish Cypriot tends to support division.
68 UN Security Council, 17 December 1993. op. cit.
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