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Whilst this argument may seem excessively pedantic, if the effect of government<br />

spending in providing refugee housing was cruciai to the recovery, that claim may<br />

be less powerful if a recovery was already in place. Following the implementation<br />

of the Emergency Action Plan 1975-76, the Planning Bureau estimated that public<br />

housing schemes had managed to accommodate 9,500 displaced families, though<br />

7,500 of them had been re-housed in vacated and "repaired" Turkish-Cypriot<br />

properties. Only 2,000 families had been provided with new public housing.<br />

Given that the number of displaced families is about 50,000... it could be<br />

said that the situation still remains very difficult, even though a number of<br />

these families succeeded in the meantime in making other more satisfactory<br />

housing arrangements. 43<br />

Perhaps the best that can be said of the government's housing programme during the<br />

crucial period of the implementation of the [first] Emergency Action Plan 44 , was<br />

that it helped to alleviate human suffering and a societal breakdown. This means the<br />

actions of the state still conformed to classical rather than Keynesian precepts. The<br />

implication is that the market and not planning or intervention, was the route of<br />

recovery. Some government incentives were directed toward the manufacturing<br />

sector though these tended to take effect after the period of most rapid relative<br />

growth had already taken place. The best that could be said is that public policies<br />

helped to sustain and expand a recovery that was already well underway. The extent<br />

to which public investment in the construction industry stimulated recovery, as<br />

Zetter suggests, is still unproven. Essentially, increased government intervention in<br />

the economy of Cyprus after 1974 seems politically inspired, and was politically,<br />

rather than economically, successful (on both sides of the UN Buffer Zone).<br />

43 Republic of Cyprus. Second Emergencv Economie Action Plan 1977-1978. Nicosia: Planning<br />

Bureau, p. 153.<br />

44 Republic of Cyprus. 1975. First Emergencv Action Plan 1975-76. Nicosia: Planning Bureau.<br />

247

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