TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT - National Labor Relations Board
TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT - National Labor Relations Board
TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT - National Labor Relations Board
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170 Twenty-sixth Annual Report of the <strong>National</strong> <strong>Labor</strong> <strong>Relations</strong> <strong>Board</strong><br />
ing of a new election is precluded by the <strong>Board</strong>'s "contract-bar" rule a°<br />
"falls within the rationale" of Brooks v N L I B, 348 1.1 S. 96 81<br />
b. Unilateral Action by Employer During Collective-Bargaining<br />
Negotiations<br />
As the Boaid construes section 8(a) (5), its affirmative command to<br />
bargain collectively with respect to rates of pay and other conditions<br />
of employment necessarily means that the employer must not act<br />
"unilaterally" by changing the status quo with respect to such matters<br />
Viewing such unilateral action as the equivalent of a categorical<br />
"refusal" to bargain about the particular subject matter involved, the<br />
<strong>Board</strong> considers it immaterial that the employer may not have been<br />
unwilling to negotiate a general agreement with the employees' representative<br />
or otherwise may not have been demonstrably acting in bad<br />
faith However, the Second Cucuit, the chief judge dissenting,<br />
rejected this rule in upsetting the <strong>Board</strong>'s finding of a section 8(a) (5)<br />
violation in the Katz case 32 During the course of long-drawn-out<br />
contract negotiations with a recently certified union, the employer here<br />
made certain changes in the employees' existing wages and working<br />
conditions, without giving the union advance notice oi an oppoitunity<br />
to bargain about the matter While stating that these unilateral actions,<br />
if "tested within the framework of the entire bargaining situation,"<br />
might have justified an inference that the employer was "no<br />
longer bargaining in good faith," the court noted that the <strong>Board</strong> had<br />
expressly declined to draw this inference, and held that an unlawful<br />
refusal to bargain was not made out in the absence of such a "definite<br />
determination of the mental attitude of the employer" 83<br />
c. Employer's Refusal To Furnish Information<br />
(1) Costs of Noncontributory Group Insurance Program<br />
In preparation for, and during the course of, negotiating a new contract,<br />
the union in the Sylvania case " requested the employer to furnish<br />
it with an itemized statement of the costs incurred by the<br />
93 See pp .39-52, above<br />
31 11on ever, the court conditioned enforcement of the <strong>Board</strong>'s order requiring the<br />
employer to bargain with the incumbent union, upon the <strong>Board</strong>'s holding an election to<br />
determine vihich union the emplo3ees now actually preferred Similar modification of<br />
bargaining orders issued by the <strong>Board</strong> were adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Perry Coal<br />
Co v NLRB, 284 F 2d 010, certiorari denied 866 U S 949, and by the Second Circuit<br />
in NLRB Supertot Fireproof Door d Sash Co. Inc , 289 F 2d 713, and NLRB v<br />
Adhesive P, °duets Corp, 281 F 2d 89<br />
13 NLRB v Benne Katz et al d/b/a Williamsburg Steel Products 0o, 289 F 2d 700<br />
The majority of the court acknowledged that its decision in this case is in conflict<br />
with the rulings of several other circuits The <strong>Board</strong> has petitioned for Supreme Court<br />
review to resolve the conflict Certiorari was granted on Oct 9, 1961<br />
a4 Sylvania Mears° Products, Inc v NLRB, 201 F 2d 128