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TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT - National Labor Relations Board

TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT - National Labor Relations Board

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192 Twenty-sixth Annual Report of the <strong>National</strong> <strong>Labor</strong> <strong>Relations</strong> <strong>Board</strong><br />

work The court, under these en cumstanc,es, concluded that the<br />

picketing at the new clubhouse was secondary and enjoined it 39<br />

d. Primary Picketing Proviso<br />

In the 1959 amendments, Congress mcorpoi ated a proviso to the<br />

secondary boycott pi °visions stating that "nothing contained in this<br />

clause (B) shall be constmed to make unlawful, where not otherwise<br />

unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing" In Baltimore<br />

Contractors" the union contended that this proviso permitted it to<br />

picket a general conti actor at a construction site to compel it to tenninate<br />

a subcontract with a nonunion employer and abide by its agreement<br />

to "subcontract work only to firms hiring union labor" Finding<br />

that such picketing continued to be unlawful under the act (see below<br />

for discussion of cases involving contracts of this nature in the construction<br />

industry), the court, citing the House Conference Report<br />

on the 1959 amendments,41 held that the pi oviso did not "change anything"<br />

in respect to the "ban on secondary boycotts" As the Supreme<br />

Court held in Local 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio ce<br />

Machine Workers v NLRB (General Electric (Jo), 386 U S 667,<br />

681, the proviso merely—<br />

was directed against the feta that the removal of "concerted" from the<br />

statute might be interpreted so that "the picketing at the factory violates section<br />

8(b) (4) (A) because the pickets induce the truck driver employed by the<br />

trucker not to perform their usual services where an object is to compel the<br />

trucking firm not to do business with the manufacturer during the strike"<br />

e. "Ally" Defense<br />

In several cases it was unsuccessfully aigued that a secondaly employer<br />

was an ally of the primary employer In El Iimparcial" the<br />

union was engaged in a labor dispute with a newspaper publishing<br />

company and had continuously picketed the primaiy employer's plant<br />

Another newspaper company, occupying leased space at the primary<br />

employer's pi emises, had a contract with the pumary employer<br />

whereby the lattei printed its newspapei The union agieed to permit<br />

se Later the Supreme Couit issued its decision in Local 761, International Union of<br />

Electrical, Radio cE Machine Workers v NLRB (General Electric Cc), 366 US 667,<br />

affirming the <strong>Board</strong>'s conclusion that picketing of a manufacturing plant gate set apart<br />

for the exclusive use of independent contractors during a dispute with the manufacturer<br />

violated the secondary boycott provisions of the act<br />

io LeBue v International Union of Operating Engincei .9, etc (Baltsmot e Contract°, 8,<br />

Inc ), 188 P SuPP 392 (D CE La) Subsequently the union consented to a <strong>Board</strong> order<br />

permanently enjoining its conduct Baltimore Contractors, Inc, Case No 15—CC-124<br />

"HR No 1147, 86th Cong. 1st Seas, p 38, Leg Hist of the <strong>Labor</strong> Management<br />

Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, vol L p 942<br />

42 Compton v Local 901, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc (Editorial El<br />

/mparcsal, Ino ), October 10, 1960 (No 249-60, DC PR)

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