TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT - National Labor Relations Board
TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT - National Labor Relations Board
TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT - National Labor Relations Board
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192 Twenty-sixth Annual Report of the <strong>National</strong> <strong>Labor</strong> <strong>Relations</strong> <strong>Board</strong><br />
work The court, under these en cumstanc,es, concluded that the<br />
picketing at the new clubhouse was secondary and enjoined it 39<br />
d. Primary Picketing Proviso<br />
In the 1959 amendments, Congress mcorpoi ated a proviso to the<br />
secondary boycott pi °visions stating that "nothing contained in this<br />
clause (B) shall be constmed to make unlawful, where not otherwise<br />
unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing" In Baltimore<br />
Contractors" the union contended that this proviso permitted it to<br />
picket a general conti actor at a construction site to compel it to tenninate<br />
a subcontract with a nonunion employer and abide by its agreement<br />
to "subcontract work only to firms hiring union labor" Finding<br />
that such picketing continued to be unlawful under the act (see below<br />
for discussion of cases involving contracts of this nature in the construction<br />
industry), the court, citing the House Conference Report<br />
on the 1959 amendments,41 held that the pi oviso did not "change anything"<br />
in respect to the "ban on secondary boycotts" As the Supreme<br />
Court held in Local 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio ce<br />
Machine Workers v NLRB (General Electric (Jo), 386 U S 667,<br />
681, the proviso merely—<br />
was directed against the feta that the removal of "concerted" from the<br />
statute might be interpreted so that "the picketing at the factory violates section<br />
8(b) (4) (A) because the pickets induce the truck driver employed by the<br />
trucker not to perform their usual services where an object is to compel the<br />
trucking firm not to do business with the manufacturer during the strike"<br />
e. "Ally" Defense<br />
In several cases it was unsuccessfully aigued that a secondaly employer<br />
was an ally of the primary employer In El Iimparcial" the<br />
union was engaged in a labor dispute with a newspaper publishing<br />
company and had continuously picketed the primaiy employer's plant<br />
Another newspaper company, occupying leased space at the primary<br />
employer's pi emises, had a contract with the pumary employer<br />
whereby the lattei printed its newspapei The union agieed to permit<br />
se Later the Supreme Couit issued its decision in Local 761, International Union of<br />
Electrical, Radio cE Machine Workers v NLRB (General Electric Cc), 366 US 667,<br />
affirming the <strong>Board</strong>'s conclusion that picketing of a manufacturing plant gate set apart<br />
for the exclusive use of independent contractors during a dispute with the manufacturer<br />
violated the secondary boycott provisions of the act<br />
io LeBue v International Union of Operating Engincei .9, etc (Baltsmot e Contract°, 8,<br />
Inc ), 188 P SuPP 392 (D CE La) Subsequently the union consented to a <strong>Board</strong> order<br />
permanently enjoining its conduct Baltimore Contractors, Inc, Case No 15—CC-124<br />
"HR No 1147, 86th Cong. 1st Seas, p 38, Leg Hist of the <strong>Labor</strong> Management<br />
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, vol L p 942<br />
42 Compton v Local 901, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc (Editorial El<br />
/mparcsal, Ino ), October 10, 1960 (No 249-60, DC PR)