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TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT - National Labor Relations Board

TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT - National Labor Relations Board

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204 Twenty-sixth Annual Report of the <strong>National</strong> <strong>Labor</strong> <strong>Relations</strong> <strong>Board</strong><br />

In the Islander camp the union, after losing an election, continued<br />

to picket with a new sign addressed to the public and stating that the<br />

employer "Does Not Have a Contract With" the union, claiming that<br />

the "type of picketing had changed from organizational and recognitional<br />

to informational" Stating that the "proviso contained in<br />

Subdivision 7(C) but confirms the fact that the Congress must have<br />

thought that what is called 'informational picketing' is forbidden,"<br />

because "if it was not the exception was not necessary," and noting<br />

that it was "doubtful that to anyone the new sign would carry any<br />

different meaning than the sign carried in the pre-election picketing,"<br />

and taking into account the union's persistent quest for recognition<br />

up to the change in the picket sign, the court found reasonable<br />

cause to believe that the postelection picketing violated section 8(b)<br />

(7) (B) and issued an injunction<br />

In Woodward Motors 8° the court reached a similar result and<br />

issued an injunction in respect to so-called proviso picketing (see<br />

below, p 206) that followed close on the heels of an orgamzational<br />

drive and a lost election, stating that it "would be naive to conclude<br />

that [the union's] sole object was to inform the public under the<br />

circumstances shown here" See also Blinstrub," where the court also<br />

found reasonable cause to believe that picketing after a lost election<br />

violated the act and enjoined it<br />

In II ested,88 however, the court refused to enjoin picketing with a<br />

proviso sign which began a month and a half after an election in<br />

which the union had filed a disclaimer of interest The court, holding<br />

that the existe4.ce of an organizational or recogmtional objective<br />

before the election does not preclude a union from engaging in lawful<br />

activity at a future time, concluded that the evidence of the union's<br />

conduct since its disclaimer was "insufficient to show a reasonably<br />

immediate object of forcing or requiring recognition or organization"<br />

Even though "the case is not entirely free from doubt," the court concluded<br />

that the evidence was insufficient "to justify the issuance of<br />

an injunction"<br />

f Other Organization and Recognition Picketing<br />

Subparagiaph (C) of section 8(b) (7) prohibits other recognition<br />

oi organization picketing for more than a reasonable period of time,<br />

85 Kennedy v Los Angeles Joint Executive <strong>Board</strong> of Hotel 5 Restaurant Employees (The<br />

Islander), 192 F Bugg 339 (D C S Calif)<br />

el Vincent v Local 182, Intonational Brothc hood of Teamsters (Woodward Motors),<br />

Wirch 1, 1901, (No 8481, DC N NY) Accord 135 NLRB No 90<br />

87 Greene v Local Joint Executive Boat d of Boston, Hotel d Restaurant Employees'<br />

Union (Blinstrub's Village d Grille, Inc ), 47 LRRM (D C Mass )<br />

Se Graham v Retasl Clerks International Association, Local No 57 (Flested Stoics Co ),<br />

188 F Sum) 847 (DC Mont )

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