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TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT - National Labor Relations Board

TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT - National Labor Relations Board

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Enforcement Litigation 177<br />

(b) Picketing at a common sans<br />

Sevei al cases decided during the year involved the scope of the<br />

picketing prohibitions contained in section 8(b) (4) (A) and (B) of<br />

the 1947 act in common-situs situations, where the situs of the pi imary<br />

dispute harbors employees of the primary employer and employees<br />

of secondary employers In Maccitee,54 the Fifth Circuit approved<br />

the <strong>Board</strong>'s finding that the union violated section 8(b) (4) (A) of<br />

the 1947 act by picketing at construction projects where both the<br />

primary employer's employees and the employees of neutral employers<br />

were working, on the ground, inter aka, that the primary employer<br />

had a permanent place of business where all of its employees regularly<br />

reported, and where the union could and did solicit their support<br />

In another common-situs case," the Second Circuit agreed with the<br />

<strong>Board</strong> that the union violated this provision by picketing near the<br />

primary employer's trucks when they were making pickups or deliveries<br />

at the premises of secondary employers However, the court<br />

stated that the mere fact that the primary employer had a separate<br />

place of business where the primary employer coin be picketed effectively<br />

"shows only that the secondary picketing had an objective other<br />

than persuading the primary employees, not that the picketing necessarily<br />

had the particular objective which § 8(b) (4) (A) forbids"<br />

The existence of this proscribed objective was shown by union conduct,<br />

apart from the picketing, which the court said warranted the<br />

infeience that secondary employers were faced with a strike threat<br />

if they continued to do business with the primary employer<br />

One common-situs case decided during the year 56 involved violations<br />

of section 8(b) (4) (i) and (n) (B) of the act as amended in<br />

1959 The Eighth Circuit agreed with the <strong>Board</strong> that the union<br />

violated these provisions by picketing in front of a construction site<br />

with an object of forcing the general contractor to cease doing business<br />

with the only subcontractor who employed nonunion men on the<br />

project, and forcing that subcontractor to recognize the union The<br />

court noted that the tests set forth in Moore Dry Dock" for determining<br />

the legality of picketing at a common situs are only "evidentiary<br />

in nature," to be employed in the absence of more direct evidence of<br />

a union's intent and purposes It then held that the <strong>Board</strong>'s unfair<br />

"NLRB v Dailas General Drivers, Local Union No 746, 281 F 2d 593, certiorari<br />

denied 365 US 826<br />

55 N L RD v Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen<br />

(6 Helpers of America (K C Refrigeration), 284 F 2d 887<br />

w h7LRB v International Hod Carriers, Building c6 Common <strong>Labor</strong>ers' Union of<br />

America, Local No 1140 (Gilmore Construction Co ), 285 F 2d 397, certiorari denied 366<br />

U S 903<br />

57 Sailors' Union of the Pacific, (Moot e Dry Dock Co ), 92 NLRB 547, 549 See Sixteenth<br />

Annual Report, pp 226-227 (1951)

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