Probate & Trust Law Section Conference Manual ... - Minnesota CLE

814 MCA, which provides that a divorce revokes any revocable
disposition or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to
the individual’s former spouse in a governing instrument. Husband died
in 2010, having never changed the designation of his former wife as
primary beneficiary under his life insurance policy. The insurance
company filed an interpleader action to determine the rightful beneficiary
under husband’s policy, given that he and wife divorced prior to
enactment of § 72-2-814, but husband died after its enactment. The court
held that the statute operates at the time of the death of the insured and
applies to any divorce that took place during the insured’s lifetime, thus
removing husband’s former wife as beneficiary of the policy in this case.
Former wife argued that revoking her as beneficiary would require
impermissible retroactive application of the law. Until the insured’s death,
however, a beneficiary has a mere expectancy in the life insurance
proceeds because the beneficiary designation may be revoked at any time.
Since the statute applies at the time of decedent’s death, the court reasoned
that it was not given retroactive effect. Prior to decedent’s death, former
wife had no vested right in the life insurance proceeds. Therefore, it was
permissible for wife to be revoked as beneficiary of decedent’s life
insurance policy under § 72-2-814.
K. When Disclaimer is Barred or Limited: 2-1106
1. In re Estate of Gardner, 283 P.3d 676 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).
Disclaimer of an interest in property is barred if the disclaimant has
already accepted the interest sought to be disclaimed. Upon decedent’s
death, friend was granted a life estate in a parcel of decedent’s real
property. Under the terms of decedent’s revocable trust, the property
would pass to decedent’s two children at the termination of friend’s life
estate. At decedent’s death, the property was subject to a $205,330
mortgage. The trustee of decedent’s revocable trust petitioned the court
for instructions to determine who, between friend and the remaindermen
(decedent’s two children), would be responsible for paying the interest and
principal of the mortgage. The court found that friend was required under
the terms of the trust to pay the interest on the mortgage. After this
determination, friend mailed a letter to the trustee seeking to disclaim her
interest in the property. The trustee claimed that friend was barred from
disclaiming her interest under A.R.S. § 14-10013(B) because she had
already accepted the interest that she sought to disclaim. The trial court
found that friend had accepted the life estate in decedent’s property by
asserting her right to exclusive possession to the exclusion of the
remaindermen and their agents, and thus, any later disclaimer was
irrevocably barred. Friend appeals the decision. On appeal, the court
reasoned that when a devisee takes possession and exercises control over
the devised property, without contemporaneously and objectively
manifesting any intent to disclaim, the acts of possession and control
constitute conclusive evidence of acceptance. Acceptance is further
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