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Humanitarian Law Centertol confiscated from one of the Albanian houses for himself. By this, thedistrict court denied the authenticity of the Republic of Serbia Ministry ofInterior - Novi Sad Secretariat of Interior Record on the Personal Search on21 May 1999, which shows that a pistol with ammunition was confiscatedfrom Saša Cvjetan and the defendant confirmed this with his personal signatureon the record. Thus, the district court is denying the fact offered byanother state authority in an authentic and credible forms and it also triesto deny the fact that defendant Saša Cvjetan illegally possessed firearmshence obviously committing the act pursuant to Article 33 Paragraph 1 ofthe Law on Weapons and Ammunition. The district court’s decision to actlike this and deny the obvious existence of this criminal act could only beexplained by its trial panel.The district court’s trial panel is constantly in the field of the “well known”.It claims in the Statement of Reasons that it was well known that every Albanianhousehold in Kosovo owned weapons, mostly unregistered. Thecourt did not even try to determine that these weapons were unregistered,but the fact is that - regardless of the origin of this weapon - defendantCvjetan illegally confiscated other people’s movable property. We came tothis conclusion because he was not acting in the capacity of the Ministry ofInterior authority for the control of weapons’ possession, but he confiscatedthe pistol in order to gain material profit for himself. It is not acceptablefor the court to support the logic that a person has right to possess unregisteredand unlicensed firearm confiscated from some other person, of courseassuming that it was unregistered firearm. If defendant Cvjetan confiscatedthat weapon while acting in capacity of the authorised officer and turned itin to the respective Secretariat of Interior body, his act, for sure, would notbe qualified as aggravated larceny. Under these circumstances, we believethat the defendant is the perpetrator of this crime and the reason for suspendingthe procedure for this act, as well, is not understandable.Completely respecting the principle of legality and in order to act conscientiouslyand responsibly, the district public prosecutor believes that thedistrict court’s decision is completely illegal and directly confronted to thefacts and evidence available. Hence, all these procedural violations and thecontradiction of facts point to the obvious illegality of the decision regardingthe application of the criminal code, thus we consider the complete decisionillegal.28