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Podujevo 1999 – Beyond Reasonable Doubtsent an entity with the conclusive reasons that have already been pointedout. This also stands for the part of the verdict’s Statement of Reasons onpage 52 i.e. the Court’s evaluation that the defendant was an experiencedsoldier; that arrival to Podujevo was not a surprise for him; that none of thekilled people or other citizens of Podujevo contributed to the defendant’semotional stress by their behaviour because none of them, unlike the defendantand the members of his unit, were armed. As for the previously determinedfacts, based on the experts’ findings and examinations that thedefendant was accountable, which is not even challenged in the DefenceCouncil’s appeals, the Supreme Court completely accepts the first instanceCourt’s reasons for the degree of the defendant’s guilt.The allegation from the appeals that the first instance Court did not presentthe reasons for the degree of guilt in the commission of the criminal actpursuant to Article 33 Para 1 of the Law on Weapons and Ammunition, unlessit represents a mistake in the composition of the appeals, is undoubtedlyunfounded since the charges for this criminal act were dismissed becausethe Public Prosecutor dropped the charges. Therefore, the first instanceCourt’s verdict must not contain reasons for the degree of guilt.Defence Counsellor Goran Rodić challenged the first instance verdict becauseit stated already in the enacting terms of the judgement ‘during thetime of war’. According to the appeal, International Law does not recognizeterm ‘the time of war’. It could only be an armed conflict, which couldbe internal or international and if there was no international conflict, thenthe provisions of the Geneva Conventions from 1949 could not be applied.The appeal becomes contradictory already on the following page statingthat the event happened ‘during the state of war’ (confiscation of ‘Zbrojevka’pistol) where the appeal itself is calling upon the state of war. Regardlessof this fact, the allegations from the appeal are unfounded.The first instance Court is correctly using the term ‘during the time of war’in the appealed verdict because the legislature was using the same term inArticle 142 of the FRY Criminal Code. And it is necessary to define notionsand facts using the terms from the law. Besides this, the FRY Criminal Codeuses both terms, the time of war and armed conflict, as synonyms. The DefenceCouncil is unfoundedly pointing to the different terminology usedby the Hague Tribunal, especially when the provisions from the local legis-349