Untitled

Humanitarian Law CenterIt is also unfoundedly claimed in the Defence Council’s appeals that not aword is mentioned in the verdict regarding the degree of guilt of the defendantin the commission of this crime. It is especially unfounded in DefenceAttorney ore Mamula’s appeal in the part where he said that thefirst instance Court ‘avoided to declare itself regarding the guilt, it doesnot even mention if the act was committed intentionally or out of negligenceand he also said that ‘the Court did not mention whether or not theact pursuant to Article 33 Para 1 of the Law on Weapons and Ammunitionwas committed with intent or out of negligence, but it does convict the defendant’.In the first instance verdict, already in the enacting terms of judgement, itwas noted that the defendant committed the act with intent. On page 40of the verdict, in its Statement of Verdict, the first instance Court concludedthat the defendant knew (was aware of) that, if he fired his weapon fromimmediate vicinity at a group of people and when he does this along withseveral other persons, it is certain that, by this, he would cause the deathof these people; he also obviously wanted the occurrence of these consequenceswhen he shot at the group of unarmed children and women…Right after this, the first instance Court assessed the circumstances underwhich the defendant committed this act, which is important for the degreeof guilt and legal assessment of the criminal act.The Supreme Court assessed that the reasons from the first instance verdictfor the degree of guilt, which were mentioned before, are clear, complete,and undoubtedly sufficient. However, the facts, which the first instanceCourt determined in the proceedings and mentioned in the reasons forthe judgement: that the defendant graduated from a Military School andwent to the Special Forces training (page 4); that he knew that the murderof civilians, women, and children was forbidden; and that the provisionsapplicable in the time of war must be absolutely obeyed completely, accordingto our and international legal provisions (page 5); that the Commanderof his unit warned the members of the unit already when the unitwas gathering that killing and looting of civilians is forbidden (page 6)…were undoubtedly determined in order to finally determine the degree ofthe defendant’s guilt in the commission of this crime. Therefore, these factsrepresent the reasons for the first instance Court, in a wider sense, to determinethe defendant’s intent in the commission of this act and they repre-348