UGANDA

NORTHERN CONFLICTS
After Tito Okello Lutwa ousted Obote in 1985, he offered an olive branch to all the fighting
factions in West Nile by inviting them to join his Government. This caused conflicting
actions from the UNRF; on the one hand, the UNRF sought to partially join the Okello
junta, 254 and on the other, the UNRF and NRA brokered a mutual support agreement in
Libya. Ultimately, Museveni convinced Ali to join the National Resistance Army (NRA) to
overthrow Okello’s Government, effectively bringing an end to the activities of the UNRF
I. They signed an agreement stipulating that if the NRA captured power, Museveni would
become President and Ali would become Vice President. UNRF I dissolved and joined the
NRA, with Ali spearheading the fighting in the North.
Following the NRA victory, Ali was not in fact appointed Vice President, but rose through
the hierarchy and served the National Resistance Movement (NRM) Government in a
variety of capacities. In 2012, following his retirement, he was promoted to the rank of
General, thereby becoming the first General in Museveni’s regime who did not come
from western Uganda.
A sizeable minority of the UNRF, which had not been included in the settlement with
the NRA, returned to the bush to form the UNRF II between 1997-98, citing concerns for
their safety. 255
Initially, community support for the UNRF I was high, especially in Koboko and Yumbe
where people believed the insurgents were fighting for the right to return home. As one
civilian stated;
“The suffering in exile is what forced people to support the
rebels. People wanted to come home”. 256
But for many others, the UNRF and Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) insurgents
were little better than the UNLA soldiers:
“During Obote II, people were forced to be with the rebels.
Those who returned, the government forced them to inform
on the supporters in the community…” 257
The West Nile region is currently emerging from decades of conflict and is struggling
to cope with the consequences. Given the multiple insurgencies that have plagued this
region, the categories of victim, perpetrator, and bystander overlap with considerable
fluidity. Participants in Arua and Adjumani blamed multiple perpetrators for the
protracted underdevelopment and neglect of the West Nile region. These included the
British Government as ‘colonial masters’, the Israelis who aided Amin in toppling Obote’s
254 Interview with Major General Bamuze, Fairway Hotel, Kampala, 28th April 2004. In: Refugee Law
Project. (2004) Negotiating peace: Resolution of conflicts in the Uganda’s West Nile region. RLP Working
Paper No. 12
255 Community dynamics in West Nile: A situation analysis, DANIDA, June 2004, p. 3
256 Interview with civilian, Arua, 19th April 2004. In: Refugee Law Project. (2004) Negotiating Peace: Resolution
of conflicts in the Uganda’s West Nile region RLP working paper no. 12 ,Pg 8
257 Interview with religious worker, Arua, 14th April 2004. In: Refugee Law Project. (2004) Negotiating
peace: Resolution of conflicts in the Uganda’s West Nile region, RLP working paper no. 12. Pg 11
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