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TJ MECHANISMS<br />

The Agreement provides that “formal courts<br />

provided for<br />

under the Constitution shall<br />

exercise jurisdiction over individuals who are alleged to bear<br />

particular responsibility for the most serious crimes, especially crimes amounting<br />

to international crimes, during the course of the conflict.” 663 Such statements raise<br />

important questions about the place traditional institutions have in facilitating justice in<br />

post-conflict contexts.<br />

Participants in the NRTJ Audit generally favoured the use of traditional justice<br />

mechanisms over formal institutions. The reasons for their preference for traditional<br />

justice, and how they envision its contribution to transitional justice are outlined in the<br />

following sections.<br />

State of Traditional Justice Institutions<br />

As participants commented on the historical and current roles of traditional justice<br />

institutions, it was clear that these varied according to district. Some of these institutions<br />

were active at the time of the NRTJ Audit, such as mato oput in Acholi sub-region 664 and<br />

traditional courts in the Buganda Kingdom, which were reinstituted after a period of<br />

inactivity, 665 as well as others like ekyaghanda in Kasese that exist without any legal<br />

663 Juba Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (2007), Clause 3.1<br />

664 Juba Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (2007), Clause 5.3<br />

665 Juba Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (2007), Clause 6.1<br />

253

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