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NORTHERN CONFLICTS<br />
52. NRA/UPDF vs Karimojong conflict (1986 - present)<br />
Conflict between the Karimojong and Ugandan state continued under Museveni’s regime<br />
with the National Resistance Army (NRA) and later the UPDF as key actors. Immediately<br />
after coming to power, NRA soldiers used ‘Kandoya’ (a method of torture used by NRA<br />
soldiers that constituted tying both hands of suspected rebel collaborators in a backward<br />
position) against the Karimojong. The conflict between the army and communities was<br />
ultimately based on the possession of small arms by Karimojong communities. In the<br />
remote region in Uganda, small arms are said to be central to security and livelihood. 290<br />
Initially, President Museveni allowed the Karimojong to keep some firearms for selfdefence<br />
against the Turkana and Pokot cattle raiders of Kenya and Uganda and the Toposa of<br />
southern Sudan. 291 However, the Ugandan Government underestimated the community’s<br />
perception of the importance of weapons and the Karimojong increased the number of<br />
weapons in their communities, leading to a high prevalence of armed violence and fatalities. 292<br />
The Government’s response over the last decade has been a number of disarmament<br />
programmes. A voluntary disarmament campaign in 2001 was followed by forceful<br />
disarmament in 2002. The latter resulted in several violent confrontations between<br />
the Karimojong warriors and the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) and several<br />
deaths. 293 These two campaigns informed the Karamoja Integrated Disarmament and<br />
Development Programme (KIDDP), implementation of which started in 2005, becoming<br />
increasingly coercive over the following two years. ‘Cordon and search’ methods<br />
in particular occasioned 294 various human rights abuses. ,295 It has been argued that<br />
these operations have not been successful and, due to the lack of alternative security<br />
provisions, have in fact contributed to an escalation in armed violence. 296<br />
This is particularly the case since the disarmament was unevenly enforced and did not<br />
happen across the border in neighbouring countries. The disarmament operations<br />
saw several violent confrontations between Government forces and the Karimojong<br />
warriors and have entrenched perceptions in Karimojong communities of the state and<br />
national army as the enemy (“ariang”) rather than as institutions providing services and<br />
protection.<br />
290 Mwaura, C. (2005) Kenya and Uganda pastoral conflict case study (No. HDOCPA-2005-20). Human<br />
Development Report Office (HDRO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).<br />
291 Ibid<br />
292 Bevan J. (2008) Crisis in Karamoja: Armed violence and the failure of disarmament in Uganda’s most<br />
deprived region, Small Arms Survey<br />
293 CDRN, CAFOD & UEC. (2007) The Search for Alternative Initiatives for Sustainable Livelihoods, Peace and<br />
Development in Karamoja. pp. 34-38<br />
294 Bevan, J. (2008) Crisis in Karamoja: Armed violence and the failure of disarmament in Uganda’s most<br />
deprived region, An occasional paper of the Small Arms Survey, Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute<br />
of International and Development Studies; Human Rights Watch. (2007) Get the gun: Human rights<br />
violations by Uganda’s national army in law enforcement operations in Karamoja Region. September. 19<br />
(13A)<br />
295 Human Rights Watch (2007) Get the gun: Human rights violations by Uganda’s national army in law<br />
enforcement operations in Karamoja Region. September. 19 (13A)<br />
296 Bevan J. (2008) Crisis in Karamoja: Armed violence and the failure of disarmament in Uganda’s most<br />
deprived region, Small Arms Survey.<br />
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