14.01.2013 Views

View/Open - Research Commons - The University of Waikato

View/Open - Research Commons - The University of Waikato

View/Open - Research Commons - The University of Waikato

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

<strong>The</strong> theory is based on the premise that shareholders are vulnerable compared to<br />

other parties in the company. Creditors for example, can safeguard their interests by<br />

adjusting interest rates according to the risks involved, while employees 38 can<br />

negotiate terms in their favour in the contracts <strong>of</strong> employment. 39 Maximising<br />

shareholders‟ wealth would encourage efficient allocation <strong>of</strong> resources and avoid<br />

wastage. By concentrating on the interests <strong>of</strong> one particular group in the company,<br />

directors would be able to discharge their duty effectively and it would be easier for<br />

the courts to monitor and review management conduct. 40 Other stakeholders would<br />

eventually benefit from this principle because maximising the pr<strong>of</strong>its <strong>of</strong> the company<br />

would result in the company‟s financial stability. 41 It reduces the risks <strong>of</strong> creditors<br />

not being paid; employees will benefit from the continuing operations and this will<br />

inevitably benefit the community as well as the economy as a whole. 42<br />

<strong>The</strong> law has provided that creditors‟ interests override those <strong>of</strong> shareholders when<br />

the company is insolvent 43 and there are other provisions which are intended to<br />

protect creditors under insolvency law 44 and under the law <strong>of</strong> distribution. However,<br />

these laws do not provide any direct access for creditors to take part in the<br />

38 See See Katherine van Wezel Stone “Policing Employment Contracts within Nexus-<strong>of</strong>-Contracts<br />

Firm” (1993) 43 Uni. Toronto LJ 353. <strong>The</strong> writer challenged the theory that have employees an<br />

ability to protect themselves through contracts; see also Jeffrey G. MacIntosh “Designing an<br />

Efficient Fiduciary Law” (1993) 43 Uni. Toronto LJ 425.<br />

39 Ibid.<br />

40 Keay “Ascertaining the Corporate Objective : an Entity Model and Sustainability Model” (2008)<br />

71 MLR 663 at 668-669 [„Corporate Objective”].<br />

41 Ibid, at 669.<br />

42 Ibid; see also Andrew Keay “Enlightened Shareholder value, the reform <strong>of</strong> the duties <strong>of</strong> company<br />

directors and corporate objectives” (2006) LMCLQ 335.<br />

43 Walker v Wimborne & Ors (1976) 137 CLR 1; Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq) (1986) 4<br />

NSWLR 722; see also chapter 5.<br />

44 For examples <strong>of</strong> provisions relating to antecedent transaction in the statute- see Chapter 11 <strong>of</strong> the<br />

thesis.<br />

126

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!