14.01.2013 Views

View/Open - Research Commons - The University of Waikato

View/Open - Research Commons - The University of Waikato

View/Open - Research Commons - The University of Waikato

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

management due to dispersed ownership. 49 In addition, the theory only benefits<br />

shareholders and does not increase social wealth as a whole. 50 For example, in order<br />

to increase shareholders‟ wealth, the company may decide to invest in a project<br />

which may endanger the ecosystem or may result in the business‟ closure. 51 In<br />

addition, shareholders are not the only group affected by the company‟s fate, for<br />

others such as creditors, employees, customers and communities have also invested<br />

in the company‟s well-being. As such, it defeats the proposition that shareholders‟<br />

interests merit protection because they are residual claimants.<br />

6.3 Stakeholders <strong>The</strong>ory<br />

Over time, various factors such as the development <strong>of</strong> new production processes,<br />

new technologies, demographic factors, and social and political forces have resulted<br />

in changes in corporate structures. 52 <strong>The</strong>se changes caused other players, apart from<br />

shareholders, to become an integral part <strong>of</strong> the companies and have become more<br />

influential than their traditional role. 53<br />

Traditionally, these stakeholders are considered as outsiders and would be able to<br />

negotiate favourable terms in contracts in order to protect themselves. 54 <strong>The</strong>se<br />

49 Berle and Means above n10 at 67.<br />

50 John Parkinson Corporate Power and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993) at 272.<br />

51 Ibid.<br />

52 R. Edward Freeman Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Pitman, Boston, 1984) at 5.<br />

53 Ibid.<br />

54 See Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock and Stuart Turnbull “An Economic Analysis <strong>of</strong> Limited<br />

Liability in Corporation Law” (1980) 30 Uni. Toronto LJ 117 at 139-145; Frank H. Easterbrook and<br />

Daniel R. Fischel “<strong>The</strong> Corporate Contract” (1989) 89 Columbia LR 1416 at 1428-1434; Frank H.<br />

Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel “Limited Liability and the Corporation” (1985) 52 Uni. Chi.L.R<br />

89 at 104-107; Ramsay above n34 at 522-523.<br />

128

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!