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View/Open - Research Commons - The University of Waikato

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9.3.3 Duty not to Fetter Discretion<br />

In exercising their duty, directors should not allow others to influence their decisions<br />

but they must weigh their decisions to ensure that the company will benefit from<br />

their action. 62 As mentioned above, the directors‟ duty is to the company, and if<br />

directors limit their discretion in accordance with the wishes <strong>of</strong> certain persons or<br />

groups, there is the possibility that they may not be able to act in the best interests <strong>of</strong><br />

the company. 63 Creditors may be affected if, as a result <strong>of</strong> directors limiting their<br />

discretion, their right to be paid is jeopardized. Likewise, if the directors‟ action does<br />

not benefit the company, creditors will also be affected because their interests are<br />

intertwined with the company‟s interests especially when they affect the company‟s<br />

chance to trade as going concern.<br />

9.3.4 Duty to Avoid Actual and Potential Conflict <strong>of</strong> Interest<br />

This duty is imposed with the aim <strong>of</strong> preventing directors from putting their interests<br />

above the company because as fiduciaries, they are involved in dealing with a third<br />

party‟s money and property, and may be tempted to act in ways that may prejudice<br />

interests <strong>of</strong> those in the company. 64 Hence, directors should be very careful to ensure<br />

not only that their action will not result in conflict <strong>of</strong> interest, but also not to put<br />

themselves in a position where there may be a possibility <strong>of</strong> conflict. <strong>The</strong> common<br />

62 See section 173 <strong>of</strong> the UK Companies Act 2006 and section 134 <strong>of</strong> the New Zealand Companies<br />

Act 1993. <strong>The</strong>re is no equivalent section in the Australian Corporations Act 2001 and the Malaysian<br />

Companies Act 1965.<br />

63 See Thorby v Goldberg (1964) 112 CLR where the court allowed directors to enter into an<br />

agreement to act in certain ways provided that at the time the agreement was signed they considered<br />

it to be in the interests <strong>of</strong> the company.<br />

64 See Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44 at 51. Lord Herschell held that “It is an inflexible rule <strong>of</strong> a court <strong>of</strong><br />

equity that a person in a fiduciary position such as respondent‟s, is not, unless otherwise expressly<br />

provided entitled to make a pr<strong>of</strong>it; he is not allowed to put himself in a position where his interest<br />

and duty conflict. It does not appear to me that this rule is, as has been said, founded on principles<br />

<strong>of</strong> morality. I regard it rather as based on the consideration that human nature being what it is, there<br />

is danger in such circumstances, <strong>of</strong> the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest<br />

rather than by duty, and thus prejudicing those he was bound to protect.”<br />

201

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