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of creditors, and both arguments are based on the economic analysis of efficiency and fairness. 66 Those supporting the duty argued that creditors are vulnerable, like shareholders, and require protection from the law. On the other hand, those who are against the imposition of this duty insisted that such duty is redundant since creditors can rely on the market and are well able to negotiate favourable terms with the company. 67 Among the mechanisms available for creditors to safeguard their interests are a) negotiating favourable terms in the contracts; b) insisting on guarantee or security, and c) other self help mechanisms. a) negotiating favourable terms in the contracts Creditors can protect themselves by negotiating with the company and because they have better access to information, they will be able to gauge the risks entailed. Hence they can adjust the interest rate so that lending is proportionate to risks incurred. Any changes in the company will be of importance to creditors and they can include in the contacts restrictions on the company‟s activities to ensure the availability of the assets in the event of winding up. 68 Creditors can also include in the contracts a requirement for the company to furnish them with frequent financial information. 69 Creditors are also aware of the possibility of directors increasing the level of riskiness after the contract has been made and will prepare against such occurrence by adjusting the interest rate. 70 66 See; Vanessa Finch “The Measures of Insolvency law” (1997) 17 OJLS 227 [“Measures”]; Roy Goode “Is the Law too Favourable to Secured Creditors? (1983-1984) Can. Bus LJ 53; Rizwaan Mokal “On Fairness and Efficiency” (2003) 66 MLR. 67 See David Wishart “Models and Theories of Directors‟ Duties to Creditors” (1999) 14 NZULR 323. 68 Halpern, Trebilcock and Turnbull above n54 at135. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 132
Despite having included favourable terms in the contract, creditors cannot foresee all contingencies and there are bound to be lacunae in the contracts. In addition, not all creditors have access to information and can dictate terms of contracts in their favour, small creditors often do not have the choice. 71 For small creditors, the costs of negotiating and drafting the contract may exceed the value of the contract itself and therefore it may not be worthwhile to pursue it. 72 b) insisting on guarantee or security Since contractual terms used by creditors are limited by unforeseeable risks, and the monitoring of costs is only effective if the benefit is greater than costs incurred, security is used as device to reduce costs. 73 Security is perceived to be more cost effective than the costs of investigating the creditworthiness of debtors as well as costs of monitoring them. 74 Creditors prefer the use of security because they are not subject to the pari passu principle 75 in the event the company is wound up. The assets which are subjected to security are not part of the general assets of the company to be distributed among the general creditors by the liquidator. Unsecured creditors may be discouraged from filing a winding petition if most of the company‟s assets are subject to security and thus will avoid premature liquidation. Creditors can also threaten to realize the security if the company fails to supply relevant information in order for them to make an accurate assessment of the company‟s 71 Ramsay above n34 at 523 72 Ibid; see also Cheffins above n8 at 503. 73 Vanessa Finch “Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price?” (1999) 62 MLR 633 at 641 [“Security”]. 74 Ibid. 75 Pari passu is one of the insolvency principles in which proceeds of realisation is to be paid to creditors in proportion according to the quantity of debts owed. See Finch “Security” above n73 at 634; Roy Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (Sweet & Maxwell, London , 2005) at [7- 01]-[7-04]. 133
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http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.n
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ABSTRACT This study examines the le
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TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i ACNOWL
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CHAPTER 5 THEORY OF THE CORPORATION
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7.3.3.3 Distribute its Capital to M
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10.2.5.1 Meaning of Insolvency 10.2
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10.6.2.2 Carrying on of any Busines
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CHAPTER 12 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMEND
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CLC Australian Company Law Cases CL
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Stanford LR Stanford Law Review Ste
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Facia Footwear Ltd (in administrati
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Re Avon Chambers Ltd [1978] 2 NZLR
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Re Produce Marketing Consortium Ltd
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Ultraframe (UK) v Fielding & Ors [2
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Mountford v Tasman Pacific Airlines
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Australia 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Ke
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Linton v Telnet Pty Ltd (1999) 30 A
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Malaysia Abdul Aziz bin Atan v Lada
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Perman Sdn Bhd & Ors v European Com
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Other Jurisdictions Singapore Rahj
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Companies Act 2006 Section 60(3)(c)
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Section 993 Section 993(2) Section
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Insolvency Act 1985 37, 70 Insolven
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Section 251 255 Part II Schedule 6
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Section 52(1) Section 52(2) Section
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Section 272(2) Section 272(2)(a) Se
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Section 385(4)(b) Section 385(4)(b)
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AUSTRALIA Absent Debtors Act (NSW)
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Section 206D(1)(b)(b)(ii) 374 secti
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Section 588FE(2)(a) Section 588FE(2
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section 588H (5) 241 Section 588H(6
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Section 598(3)(b) Section 598(3)(c)
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Bankruptcy Act 1967 MALAYSIA Sectio
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Section 130A(6) 391 Section 131 221
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Companies Regulation 1966 Regulatio
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CHAPTER 1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THES
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A discussion of directors’ duties
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The far-reaching implication of cor
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2.2.1 The United Kingdom The common
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2.2.3 Australia Australia has been
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE SURVEY - AN OV
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shareholders, had failed to mitigat
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was mainly responsible for the chal
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3.3 Interests in the Company-Shareh
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contributed by the shareholders and
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Statutes have attempted to address
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how the matter should be dealt with
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4.2 Development of Corporate and In
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colonies. 14 The emergence of compa
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originally incorporated in order to
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usiness fraud. 42 In 1825, the Bubb
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Companies Act also reveals providin
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Companies Ordinance 1953 of Sabah a
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In 1977, the Cork Committee was app
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the Committee foresaw difficulty du
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operation and termination of a comp
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enforceability of security interest
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procedure, and dispensed with the o
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The creditors‟ protection princip
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shareholders and on personal bankru
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directors as trustees. 162 Members
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4.3.3 Development of Insolvency Leg
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In Australia, the government respon
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appointment of an administrative re
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the current statutes were not effic
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insist on protection to directors i
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and judgment to run the company. 21
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due to the difficulty in obtaining
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The Australian Law Commission in 19
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instead, enacted section 135 253 in
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4.5 Conclusion Malaysia, New Zealan
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CHAPTER 5: THE THEORY OF THE CORPOR
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needs someone to run it on its beha
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The implication of the decision is
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English decisions as guidance and t
Page 151 and 152: Shareholders who have to incur high
Page 153 and 154: interests of shareholders by maximi
Page 155 and 156: situation, directors have a duty to
Page 157 and 158: concluded purchasing goods from thi
Page 159 and 160: stipulates directors “may conside
Page 161 and 162: subsidiary and may continue to pros
Page 163 and 164: A holding company may use a subsidi
Page 165 and 166: section 187 of the Australian Corpo
Page 167 and 168: its holding company), act in a mann
Page 169 and 170: is just and equitable, to make an o
Page 171 and 172: Syndicates (NZ) Limited (in liq) 13
Page 173 and 174: a) Extent to which the Related Comp
Page 175 and 176: That the management did not differe
Page 177 and 178: equirement of insolvency and it doe
Page 179 and 180: The House of Lords in Woolfson v St
Page 181 and 182: subsidiary. Abdul Malik J held that
Page 183 and 184: defendant company. During a meeting
Page 185 and 186: Uniphoenix Corporation Bhd v Raymon
Page 187 and 188: justice alone is not sufficient; th
Page 189 and 190: lenders, employees, suppliers and c
Page 191 and 192: company and as the residual claiman
Page 193 and 194: The claim that shareholders‟ righ
Page 195 and 196: particularly lack of effective mana
Page 197 and 198: management of the companies. Credit
Page 199 and 200: players‟ interests intertwine wit
Page 201: important for directors to build lo
Page 205 and 206: at the intersection of a number of
Page 207 and 208: Directors must weigh any particular
Page 209 and 210: Directors will also enlist the serv
Page 211 and 212: Contractarians regard employees in
Page 213 and 214: terms to their liking, they either
Page 215 and 216: to boycott the company. 134 The com
Page 217 and 218: On the other hand, the duty owed to
Page 219 and 220: and experiences in order to dischar
Page 221 and 222: CHAPTER 7: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF
Page 223 and 224: Economists divided real capital whi
Page 225 and 226: the transformation of shares as rea
Page 227 and 228: the company‟s ability to pay its
Page 229 and 230: purchase or will not become insolve
Page 231 and 232: available where special resolution
Page 233 and 234: The idea that maintaining share cap
Page 235 and 236: must be satisfied by the company in
Page 237 and 238: 7.4 Conclusion The doctrine of capi
Page 239 and 240: and once a resolution is passed, to
Page 241 and 242: The term 'insolvency' has also long
Page 243 and 244: equivalent to medical negligence ca
Page 245 and 246: meaning of inability to pay debts.
Page 247 and 248: It is important to distinguish as t
Page 249 and 250: long as the accounts give true and
Page 251 and 252: current assets must be taken stock
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cases the presumption of insolvency
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It is interesting to note in reachi
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CHAPTER 9 THE COMMON LAW DUTIES OF
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Voluntary creditors can be divided
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are not personally liable for any l
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confidence, a trustee who has been
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interests of various parties in the
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overriding duty is to the sharehold
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to look at the directors‟ purpose
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9.3.3 Duty not to Fetter Discretion
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The decisions of the Federal Court
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case, directors should disclose the
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misconception that the case law and
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other reference as to the developme
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Australia and Malaysia have express
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out “ ...the judgment is in the b
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the prospect of success as well as
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judge adopted the principle of iden
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individual trading through a compan
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liability can be imposed on them wh
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liquidators when it is insolvent. C
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CHAPTER 10 DIRECTORS’ DUTY TO PRE
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Malaysia did not make any changes o
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interpretation of these provisions.
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sum of money that is owed or due.
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Hence, action can be brought agains
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Directors in Australia can be held
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to the director to prove that he or
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expect that the company was solvent
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In the case of Secretary of State f
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trading at a deficit. 64 In other w
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maintained in section 213 of the In
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not „a party‟ if he knew that m
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econcile the two judgments with one
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carrying it on (whether because of
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10.3.1.3 For any other Fraudulent P
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company. In this aspect, section 21
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to Australia and New Zealand which
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even though it was evident from the
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the steps taken were with the aim o
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decisions. 150 Therefore, directors
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The Law Commission proposed that th
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to reform the law, namely to reduce
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A similar issue was raised in the E
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The decision was later upheld by th
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10.4.3 Duty in relation Obligation
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fraudulent purpose.” 201 Although
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from the carrying on of the busines
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The first civil version of the inso
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amounts. 223 In Hussein v Good, 224
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of law of contract. The court must
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defendant. 244 Therefore, a directo
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additional capital, as well as a re
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trading without any other action ta
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Another defect of the section is in
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argue that there are reasonable gro
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10.6.2 Responsibility for Fraudulen
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Siow Yoon Keong v H Rosen Engineeri
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The courts have acknowledged that t
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The defendant in the case relying o
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To date, there have been few cases
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ability of the company to pay off i
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can be disqualified from taking par
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power to do so is an archaic equita
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is for a short period of time. This
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ights against the company are froze
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involves a situation where the comp
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11.2.3 Winding-up Liquidation is a
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11.2.3.1 Effects of Successful Avoi
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transactions, 59 the provisions cle
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11.2.3.1.2 Recovery from Third Part
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ecover the proceeds of sale or to p
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order. 83 If the value of the asset
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Without this class action, the unse
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the power to apply for a compensati
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defraud, which implies their culpab
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also be enforced by the company. 11
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The court has the power if it think
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contravention or pecuniary penalty
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discretion to order the director‘
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Marketing Consortium (No 2) 147 cle
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discovered that the director had en
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compensatory. 163 Damages are asses
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of causation similar to torts in as
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ecause the court considered that it
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It should be noted that Re Cyona Di
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11.3.7.2.3 Duration The court also
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contribution order is made to the
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This is similar to the case of frau
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company is using funds belonging to
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Since section 304(1) originates fro
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11.3.8.2 Problems of Enforcement/Pr
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However, extracting promise of inde
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In relation to an action against a
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Investments Commission is entitled
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The position in Australia has clear
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Disqualification on the grounds of
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As a result of the recommendations
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exercised by the Registrar or the O
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actions which are committed with a
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The court has to deduce evidence of
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11.4.2.1 Standard of Proof Disquali
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11.4.2.2 Court’s Order Section 6
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of disqualification. 322 However, t
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mitigating factors considered by th
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11.5 Other Remedies 11.5.1 Mareva I
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for under the Act. 348 The action p
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of trust or breach of duty in relat
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CHAPTER 12 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMEND
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The separate legal personality conc
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deemed to be an alien concept to Br
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positive action to minimize losses
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insolvent. In Malaysia, there is no
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BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS and ARTICLES AHM
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BENNETT, Howard, 'Late Floating Cha
Page 483 and 484:
COBURN, Niall F, 'Insolvent Trading
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http://ssrn.com/abstract=988944 at
Page 487 and 488:
FISHER, Gregory, LEE , Janet and JO
Page 489 and 490:
GUNASEKARA, Gehan and TOY, Alan, 'L
Page 491 and 492:
HOPT, Klaus J., 'Comparative Compan
Page 493 and 494:
KEAY, Andrew and Murray, Michael, '
Page 495 and 496:
McCHESNEY, Fred S., 'Economics, Law
Page 497 and 498:
OTTOLENGHI, S, 'From Peeping Behind
Page 499 and 500:
ROSS, Mike, Corporate Reconstructio
Page 501 and 502:
SCHWARTZ, Alan, ‗A Normative Theo
Page 503 and 504:
WALTERS, Adrian, 'Void Dispositions
Page 505 and 506:
WORTHINGTON, Sarah, 'Subrogation Cl
Page 507 and 508:
REPLIES TO EXAMINERS APPENDIX 1 Pag
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Page 220-it is asserted that direct
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What are the criteria for determini
Page 513 and 514:
addition it provides incentive for
Page 515 and 516:
See also Secretary of State for Tra
Page 517 and 518:
Most jurisdictions in Australia hav
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