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View/Open - Research Commons - The University of Waikato

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management <strong>of</strong> the companies. Creditors could not restrain companies or directors<br />

from any actions even if they fear these would lead to the company‟s failure. Even<br />

when the company is in liquidation, generally the right to take action against the<br />

company or directors is not conferred on creditors but on the liquidator.<br />

6.2.1 Limitations <strong>of</strong> the <strong>The</strong>ory<br />

<strong>The</strong> shareholder supremacy theory concentrates on the objective <strong>of</strong> increasing the<br />

shareholders‟ value. However, it does not provide a clear explanation as to what<br />

constitutes shareholders‟ value. 45 It is unclear whether directors should focus on<br />

generating short term pr<strong>of</strong>its for shareholders or on the company‟s long term<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>itability. <strong>The</strong> absence <strong>of</strong> exact definition causes difficulty to creditors in<br />

assessing whether they have fulfilled the said objectives, especially when<br />

shareholders themselves may not have homogenous interests in the company.<br />

<strong>The</strong> theory has also been regarded as restricted in two ways. First it does not<br />

acknowledge investors‟ ability to diversify. 46 In other words, the theory does not take<br />

into account the possibility <strong>of</strong> shareholders having multiple roles; it only considers<br />

their interests as shareholders alone. 47 Second, the theory may discourage those other<br />

than shareholders to invest in the company since they know that their interests will<br />

be subordinate to shareholders'. 48<br />

Under the theory, shareholders are motivated to monitor the directors in order to<br />

protect their investment, but shareholders seldom exercise effective control over<br />

45 Keay, “Corporate Objective” above n40 at 670.<br />

46 Ibid.<br />

47 Ibid.<br />

48 Ibid.<br />

127

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