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View/Open - Research Commons - The University of Waikato

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Page 220-it is asserted that directors should be able to escape liability if they can<br />

show their decisions were made in good faith and for the benefit <strong>of</strong> the company and<br />

the concept is wide enough to cover all aspects <strong>of</strong> directors’ duties.<br />

<strong>The</strong> duty referred to in this situation is in relation to creditors before winding up and what<br />

is suggested that directors should make decisions based in good faith for the benefit <strong>of</strong><br />

the company. Benefit to the company should not be measured only in terms <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>it but<br />

also the impact <strong>of</strong> the decision on the company‘s wellbeing. 7 Directors should be able to<br />

show that proper consideration has been given to all parties involved in in the company.<br />

It is also important for a director not to take unnecessary risks and risk exposing the<br />

company to insolvency. This recommendation is made in relation to Malaysian law<br />

which at the moment has an ineffective insolvent trading provision.<br />

In addition the Malaysian Companies Act 1965 has a provision on a business judgment<br />

rule 8 whose fundamental purpose is to protect the authority <strong>of</strong> directors in the exercise <strong>of</strong><br />

their duties and to clarify their liability. <strong>The</strong> business judgment rule is aimed at<br />

facilitating legitimate business decisions and risk taking and thus encourages commerce.<br />

By widening the application <strong>of</strong> the common law on this matter to take account <strong>of</strong> the<br />

creditor‘s interests it hoped that it would encourage directors to be more accountable for<br />

the company‘s financial situation and would improve the insolvent company‘s creditors<br />

by imposing liability on directors for breach <strong>of</strong> duty. It would also encourage directors to<br />

seek advice from competent pr<strong>of</strong>essionals when financial difficulties are lurking. In the<br />

absence <strong>of</strong> any real deterrence, directors who owe very limited duties to creditors can<br />

7 It is acknowledged that in New Zealand is not as such as illustrated in the case <strong>of</strong> Robb v Sojourner [2008]<br />

1 NZLR 493 at [31] (CA). In the case, the Court <strong>of</strong> Appeal when deciding whether directors have<br />

breached their duty <strong>of</strong> good faith and to act in the best interests <strong>of</strong> the company looked at whether the sale<br />

<strong>of</strong> the assets <strong>of</strong> the company to an associated company was at fair value. Despite acknowledging the<br />

policy consideration which may favour the ring-fencing <strong>of</strong> losses and the setting up <strong>of</strong> the phoenix<br />

company to preserve a salvageable business, the court decided that the directors have breached their duty-<br />

―Directors who propose to adopt this course however should take care to ensure that the value paid by the<br />

phoenix is fair. This is likely to involve , at the very least, a contemporaneous independent valuation <strong>of</strong> the<br />

assets being acquired.‖<br />

8 See discussion in the thesis chapter 9 at 207-213.<br />

438

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