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View/Open - Research Commons - The University of Waikato

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CHAPTER 12 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS<br />

12.1 Conclusion<br />

Separate legal entity and limited liability intertwine at a point where it involves<br />

directors’ act contrary to the interests <strong>of</strong> the company. Separate legal entity allows<br />

the person managing the company to hide behind the veil to avoid liability because<br />

the purported act belongs to the company which has its own personality. Limited<br />

liability on the other hand applies only to shareholders where their liability to<br />

contribute to the company’s liability depend on the amount <strong>of</strong> unpaid on their shares.<br />

Separate legal entity also provides opportunity for directors to act in their interests<br />

instead <strong>of</strong> shareholders. <strong>The</strong> law was developed then to impose duty on directors to<br />

act in the interests <strong>of</strong> the company. Shareholders are protected in this aspect because<br />

company’s interests have been equated as their interests and hence any director who<br />

acts contrary to those interests may be personally liable. Furtherance the company’s<br />

commercial success will nearly always be in the interests <strong>of</strong> the shareholders, but the<br />

conduct sometimes requires, for example, plant closure or the use <strong>of</strong> environmentally<br />

damaging production processes will <strong>of</strong>ten harmful other groups.<br />

Although a company’s success although in most cases refers to pr<strong>of</strong>it maximisation<br />

and in line with shareholders’ interests, the primary concern <strong>of</strong> the directors should<br />

be the company and not shareholders. This will avoid conflict <strong>of</strong> interests among all<br />

stakeholders if directors are able to act solely for the best interests <strong>of</strong> the company as<br />

a firm. <strong>The</strong>re will be circumstances where the company’s interests may not be<br />

parallel to pr<strong>of</strong>it maximisation for example; a goal <strong>of</strong> short term pr<strong>of</strong>it maximisation<br />

implies conduct different in important respects from that required by a long term<br />

pr<strong>of</strong>it goal. 1 Long term pr<strong>of</strong>itability may depend on investing in research and<br />

development, capital equipment and training for example expenditure which will be<br />

avoided where the objective is to maximise pr<strong>of</strong>its only in the short term. 2 In respect<br />

1 John Parkinson Corporate Power and Responsibility Issues in the <strong>The</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> Company Law<br />

(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993) at 90<br />

2 Ibid.<br />

399

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