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View/Open - Research Commons - The University of Waikato

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shareholders, had failed to mitigate "the rigidities <strong>of</strong> the „folklore‟ <strong>of</strong> corporate entity in<br />

favour <strong>of</strong> the legitimate interests <strong>of</strong> the company‟s creditors." 6<br />

<strong>The</strong> modern economic theories <strong>of</strong> corporation generally can be divided into two main<br />

approaches: managerialism and contractarianism. 7 Managerialism stems from the work <strong>of</strong><br />

Berle and Means in 1932 and influences the development <strong>of</strong> corporate law. 8 <strong>The</strong> heart <strong>of</strong><br />

this theory based on a study <strong>of</strong> American capitalism, revealed that the majority <strong>of</strong> large<br />

public companies' managements have escaped effective shareholder control. 9 <strong>The</strong> current<br />

economic system shows that most companies are owned by passive investors who, in<br />

many cases, have not even seen the property from which they derive their pr<strong>of</strong>its. 10 A<br />

company‟s control, as a result lies, with the management.<br />

<strong>The</strong> idea <strong>of</strong> the company and the person controlling the company as separate does not sit<br />

well with the company structures. 11 This is because the decision-making which lies with<br />

directors raises opportunity for them to swindle the company‟s assets at the expense <strong>of</strong><br />

both creditors and shareholders. 12 This weakness <strong>of</strong> control results in shareholders opting<br />

to remain passive or to vote with management. 13 <strong>The</strong> state <strong>of</strong> shareholders‟ inactivity<br />

enables managers to pursue objectives <strong>of</strong> their own choosing, other than the<br />

6 Otto Kahn-Freund “Some Reflections on Company Law Reform” (1944) 7 MLR 54 at 55.<br />

7 Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means <strong>The</strong> Modern Corporation and Private Property (<strong>The</strong> Macmillan<br />

Company, New York, 1932); Adolf A Berle and Gardiner C Means <strong>The</strong> Modern Corporation and<br />

Private Property (Revised ed., Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, 1968) at 312-313; Ross Grantham<br />

and Charles Rickett Company and Securities Law Commentary and Law (Brookers Ltd, Wellington,<br />

2002) at 54-55; Brian Cheffins Company Law: <strong>The</strong>ory, Structure and Operation (Clarendon Press,<br />

Oxford, 1997) 31-41; John Parkinson Corporate Power and Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford,<br />

1993) at 54-56 and at 97-132.<br />

8 Ibid.<br />

9 Ibid.<br />

10 Ibid.<br />

11 Farrar “Frankenstein” above n4 at 149.<br />

12 Berle and Means above n7 at 67; Grantham and Rickett above n7 at 62; Cheffins above n7 at 65;<br />

Parkinson above n7 at 63-70.<br />

13 Ibid; Edwin M Dodd: For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45 Harv LR 1145 at 1153.<br />

13

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