CAPITALISM'S ACHILLES HEEL Dirty Money and How to

362 CAPITALISM’S ACHILLES HEEL
Rawls is clear in his purpose: “Perhaps I can best explain my aim in this
book as follows. During much of modern moral philosophy the predominant
systematic theory has been some form of utilitarianism.” 3 In its place,
Rawls seeks to “work out a conception of justice that provides a reasonably
systematic alternative to utilitarianism, which in one form or another has
long dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition . . .” 4
Rawls states his position:
I do not believe that utilitarianism can provide a satisfactory account of
the basic rights and liberties of citizens as free and equal persons, a requirement
of absolutely first importance . . . 5
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even
the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice
denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good
shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few
are outweighed by the larger sums of advantages enjoyed by many. . . .
[R]ights secured by justice are not subject to . . . the calculus of social
interests. 6
Whereas Bentham deprecated rights and liberties, subordinating them to
utility, Rawls puts rights and liberties in the position of “absolutely first
importance.”
Rawls poses a thought experiment. Suppose that rational people meet in
an “original position,” a position without precedent where they can negotiate
the terms of their association. Furthermore, suppose they meet behind a
“veil of ignorance” where the participants do not know their own class, status,
fortune, ability, intelligence, strength, race, sex, and the like. From this
original position behind a veil of ignorance, the principles of justice are to be
chosen. The principles that emerge will be those that “free and rational persons
concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position
of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association.
These principles are to regulate all further agreements . . .” 7
Rawls cogently argues:
[I]t hardly seems likely that persons who view themselves as equals, . . .
would agree to a principle which may require lesser life prospects for
some simply for the sake of a greater sum of advantages enjoyed by