09-151.pdf

Instead, visitors should be brought by vehicles from the southern side
of the Joint Security Area. Subsequently, there were no visitors by
KPA/CPV members to the Swedish-Swiss camp. The KPA/CPV did not
accept any further invitations and social activities across the demarcation
line were frozen until the 1980s. Not until January 24, 1989 did
the Deputy Head of the Swedish delegation succeed in bringing both
parties’ MAC secretaries, colonels from the CPV and the Republic of
Korea and the NNSC alternates to a luncheon in the Swedish camp.
For the first time since 1961, North Korean and Chinese officers then
crossed the border.
Major General Sven Uggla, Head of the Swedish NNSC Delegation,
wrote in his report for September 1963-March 1964 to the Chief of the
Army that both parties of the MAC pointed out the Commission’s great
importance. That representants of four countries were on both sides of
the border and could meet and socialize over the border as well as
attend MAC meetings probably somewhat lowered tension. This was
important not least since the North regarded the US forces not as UN
troops but as American invaders. However, in the case of a major
conflict, the NNSC would not be helpful. 104 The evaluation supports
the author’s opinion that the Commission’s significance should not be
overvalued.
104_ Försvarets Läromedelscentral, Historik över de neutrala ländernas övevakningskommission
i Korea, pp. 31, 42; Geijer, “Något om svenskarna i Panmunjom,”
Joboseyo (1961), no. 1, p. 30; Kim, ibid., 2003, p. 181; Mueller-Lhotska, Swiss
Mission to Korea in the Changes of Tim: 1953-1997, pp. 66-7; NNSC Chief Delegates
- List Updated April 14, 1997 Uggla, Till: Chefen för armén, Stockholm 90
(Panmunjom, March 26, 1964), pp. 0, 1; Werner, Månadsrapport januari 1989 (n.
p., January 31, 1989), p. 3; Wikland, ibid., bilaga 1,pp. 1-2, 6. Original quotation
marks.
Rising Tensions on the Korean Peninsula during the 1960s
125