09-151.pdf

1998, the most outstanding outcomes were the agreements reached
between the UNC and the KPA in November 2000 to open some areas
of the DMZ and in September 2002 to open the eastern railway.
Significantly, the work by the MAC came to include the exhumation
and return of soldiers’ remains from the war that also involved the
NNSC, albeit on a limited scale. Following bilateral US-North Korea
talks, the MAC handled such issues by including them on the agenda,
thereby indicating a capability to promote peace outside the mandate.
The main initial difficulty for the NNSC was the contradiction
that the mandate was sub-ordinated to the MAC member states that it
was required to supervise. The NNSC was also weakened by
simultaneously implementing inspections of introduction of military
equipment that both parties obstructed, the internal split in an East
and West bloc due to the Cold War, the even number of members and
the absence of a referee for decision-making. The withdrawal of the
inspection teams ordered by the UNC in 1956 and the unilateral
suspension of Paragraph 13(d), prohibiting rearmaments in 1957 by
the UNC, transformed it into “a Commission without supervision.”
From then onwards, the NNSC no longer supervised the MAC
members, who could rearm freely. Later, from 1991 onwards, North
Korea’s policy to undermine the Commission further weakened it.
Nonetheless, as a third party the NNSC has played a role in
maintaining peace that no other body could have undertaken. During
the 1968 Pueblo incident, the 1976 axe murder and the 1984 shooting
incident in the Joint Security Area, the NNSC, on the basis of “positive
symmetry”, played an important role in reducing tension and bringing
the crises to an end. On the two latter occasions, the NNSC also
contributed to the introduction of safety-enhancing measures.
General Conclusions
523