09-151.pdf

which had not suffered a seizure in international waters since 1815
when the British navy seized the USS President outside New York.
On January 24, four meetings on how to handle the crisis were
held in the US. Opinions among high officials were divided between
those who advocated retaliation, including the kidnapping of North
Korean ships, and those who preferred negotiations. The US government
chose the latter, not least since the country was involved in the
Vietnam War; it was clear that the US could not expect to win the war,
which had led to a nation-wide anti-war movement. Nonetheless, the
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise that was heading for Vietnam
was immediately brought into the area to put pressure on North
Korea. According to Mobley (2003), “...the United States prepared for
war while seeking to avoid it. The build-up was costly because it
diverted assets needed in Vietnam. Naturally, the DPRK urged the
United States to end the military pressure.” Two other aircraft carriers
were also brought into waters close to the Korean peninsula and
fighter planes were moved from Japan to bases in South Korea. On
January 28, there were, including planes on ships, 155 fighter planes
in the Korean peninsula and the surrounding waters. 167
At the 261st MAC meeting requested by the UNC/MAC held on
January 24, the US made it clear that it was deeply concerned about the
January 21 commando attack. The UNC/MAC Senior Member, Rear
Admiral John V. Smith, first focused on the assassination attempt on
President Park Chung Hee. He charged North Korea with killing and
wounding South Korean civilians and national police officers on the
167_ Hong, op. cit., 2003, pp. 59-60; Lee, op. cit., 1998(c), p. 5: op. cit., 2001(a), p. 19;
Lerner, op. cit., pp. 60, 82, 86, 239: fn. 1; Mobley, op. cit., p. 75.
204 Peace-keeping in the Korean Peninsula