09-151.pdf

presented by the Czech and Polish members at an informal meeting
with their Swiss counterpart on February 22. It was requested that the
Swedish and the Swiss members should approach the US. To restart
negotiations, the members submitted without any comments the proposals
on the same day. The US reaction was, as expected, negative; the
proposal was regarded as “quite impossible” due in particular to the
relations with South Korea. No progress was made during March either. 176
Meanwhile, three days after the Enterprise had steamed north,
North Korean MiGs scrambled from Wônsan to try to locate the ship
and its auxiliary vessels; the deployment of the Enterprise battle group
meant that the US could retaliate with little warning. During February,
Major General Pak often threatened to terminate the private meetings
of the MAC senior members unless the USS Enterprise and its escort
vessels were removed from “Korean waters,” but negotiations continued.
General Pak informally expressed to the UNC North Korea’s willingness
to settle the incident through dialogue if the US would negotiate
rather than threaten North Korea by showing force. He also threatened
that “only bodies” would be returned if force was used in an attempt
to free the crew.
Admiral Smith’s response was that the US would continue to
pursue a prompt and peaceful solution to the problem. The dual US
approach to preparing militarily while pursuing diplomatic efforts at
the UN was alarming to North Korean interests. On February 2, Kim
Il Sung sent a laudatory letter to the Navy unit that had seized the
Pueblo. He thanked the “men, non-commissioned officers and officers
176_ Downs, ibid., pp. 130-131, 135; Hong, ibid., 2003, p. 63; Kim, ibid., 2003, p. 186;
Lee, op. cit., 2001(a), p. 31; Swedish Group NNSC, Slutrapport H:10, p. 2. Original
quotation marks.
Rising Tensions on the Korean Peninsula during the 1960s
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