09-151.pdf

agreement. Consequently, Lee (2001b) points out that the appointment
was not a Koreanization of Panmunjom, although on October 1,
1991, South Korea took over responsibility for security in the area
from the US, making it clearer that it was a party to the armistice.
On May 9, 1991, the KPA/CPV informed representatives that
reports on rotation of personnel and replacements of combat materials
in accordance with Paragraph 13(c) and (d) would not be delivered
any more, but the UNC continued to report on personnel. The reason
was said to be that reports by the UNC on personnel were incorrect
and did not, for instance, reflect the rotation of personnel associated
with “Team Spirit” exercises. From this time onwards, no minutes and
reports were received from the NNSC. Since the North did not wish to
receive reports from the South, there was no need any longer to hold
Joint Duty Officers meetings. The KPA/CPV cancelled the daily Joint
Duty Officers meeting that handled the reports, but in 1992 frequent
meetings were held to raise issues in the JSA. Almost all formal
meetings between the two sides of the MAC were cancelled, but Senior
Members continued to meet.
Informal meetings took place but less frequently than before and
they were less available since no official minutes were kept. Informal
meetings between the MAC secretaries with the rank of colonel were
held rather often, but a few formal meetings also took place. James
Munhang Lee, special advisor to the UNC Commander and the MAC
on armistice affairs, maintained informal contact with North Korean
MAC members and their staff with guidance from the UNC Chief of
Staff and the Commander. 304 The direct telephone line was maintained.
304_ American-Korean Lee had as special advisor to the UNC/MAC since 1963 made
North Korea Incapacitates the MAC and the NNSC in the 1990s
391