09-151.pdf

On April 23, North Korea issued a “DPRK Government Statement”
that charged the US with intruding “deep into the territorial air
of the DPRK to conduct hostile acts of espionage.” It objected, “On
April 18, Nixon described it as if it were their right or a matter of course
to conduct reconnaissance activities against our country, and said that
reconnaissance flights against our country would continue in the
future too.” Finally, it warned, “If the reconnaissance planes of the U.S.
imperialists intrude into the territorial air of our country, we will not
sit with folded arms, but will take resolute measures to safeguardour
sovereignty.”
While no MAC meetings were held for four months after April
18, informal contacts were maintained through the NNSC: Sergel
points out that the main role played by the Commission at this time
was to maintain North-South communication, a role that was not
prescribed in the Armistice Agreement. On July 25, departing Major
General Knapp had invited the NNSC delegations to lunch to present
his successor. On the anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, July 27,
the delegations were invited by the KPA/CPV Senior Member to
dinner in Kaesông. At the 291st MAC meeting held on August 14,
Major General Ri criticized the UNC/MAC for walking out of the April
18 meeting and said that the EC-121 incident had nothing to do with
the “main subject” of the meeting North Korea had called. 148
A new incident took place on August 17, 1969, at about 10.45
a.m.. An unarmed American observation helicopter (OH-23) on a
148_ Downs, ibid., pp. 147-8; Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 156; Lee,
ibid., 2001(a), p. 50: op. cit., 2004, p. 50; Mobley, ibid., pp. 112, 132, 139; Sergel,
ibid., April 30, 1969, p. 10: Månadsrapport för juli 1969 (Panmunjom, July 31,
1969), pp. 4, 5. Original quotation marks.
Rising Tensions on the Korean Peninsula during the 1960s
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