09-151.pdf

ecome “a mission impossible.” However, both countries opposed the
US policy to persuade them to leave the NNSC; the opinion was that
a voluntary withdrawal would cause tension in their relations with
communist countries, not least China and the Soviet Union. Instead of
reducing the NNSC’s activities, they therefore suggested that the MAC
should be given a greater role. In spite of American pressure exerted
through the Swedish Embassy in the US, Sweden and Switzerland
refused to withdraw. Instead, it was decided to reduce the inspection
teams by one in both North and South Korea. Unlike the US, both
China and North Korea wanted the NNSC and the Armistice
Agreement to remain and were supported by the Soviet Union, Poland
and Czechoslovakia; a status quo would make it possible to exert
influence on developments in the South.
At this time, it was possible for North Korea to simultaneously
point out “the clearly stated aggressive South Korean plans to unify
Korea by military force” and praise itself to “be the truly peace-loving
people that in cooperation with the neutral nations worked for a final
solution of the Korean issue.” Notably, at the 69th MAC meeting
requested by the KPA/CPV held on February 25, 1956, the North
praised the NNSC for its efforts to maintain peace on the Korean
peninsula. 72
On September 5, 1955, the “Fix-Teams” were withdrawn from
Ch’ôngjin and Hûngnam in the North and Kangnûng and Taegu in the
South: ports of entry were reduced to Inch’ôn, Pusan and Kunsan in
the South and Sinûiju, Sinanju and Manp’o in the North. The
72_ Bruzelius, op. cit., p. 600; Försvarets Läromedelscentral, ibid., p. 25; Julin, op. cit.;
Kukpang chôngbo ponbu, op. cit., 1993, p. 50; Pak, ibid., 2003, p. 45. Original
quotation marks.
80 Peace-keeping in the Korean Peninsula