essential-guide-to-qualitative-in-organizational-research

174 –––––––––– QUALITATIVE METHODS IN ORGANIZATION STUDIES ––––––––––––––––––In sum three important associations emerged, the populist-realist, the workgroup leadercynicand the leader-sceptic. Although this covariance between unique case features andcategories was important to any theoretical explanation, it was also important to explore whatkind of rationale might underpin these apparent conjunctions in my data and elucidate thedirections of causation.Phase IV: theorizationPOPULIST-REALIST ASSOCIATIONIt was plausible that informant’s populism might exacerbate their susceptibility to accountingrenditions of reality since such apparently objective information enabled them to ‘rationally’transmit the ‘facts’ to constituents and facilitated their avoidance of taking unmandateddecisions. If constituents wilfully chose to ignore those financial ‘facts’ and adopt ‘irrational’courses of action, he was personally divorced from any responsibility in his role as delegate.However it was plausible that ‘realism’ could cause ‘populism’. For instance ‘realism’ mightabrogate them from the responsibility for defining constituents’ interests and engender the roleof reactive messenger because DAI constituted immutable facts that had to be transmittedregardless of their palatability.The only way I could test the direction of causation was to investigate whether or not‘realists’ had been ‘populists’ prior to their exposure to in-company financial training. Despiteone exception it appeared that financial training was a possible case feature that differentiated‘sceptics’ from both ‘realists’ and ‘cynics’, but the varying use of accounting information by‘cynics’ and ‘realists’ implied the influence of some further discriminating factor. Thereforein a third round of interviews, with all the ‘realists’ I attempted to elucidate whether they hadalways adopted a ‘populist’ role, particularly with regard to delegacy, and especially prior totheir exposure to in-company financial training. From the resulting data it appeared that‘populism’ preceded ‘realism’ – the statement below was typical . . .. . . I’ve always been a go-between . . . At first I didn’t have much of an opinion aboutthe messages . . . but since I’ve gained more experience I think that sometimes the ladswon’t face up to the [financial] facts . . . but that’s up to them isn’t it . . .THE WORKGROUP LEADER-CYNIC ASSOCIATIONThe ‘cynic’ shares the realist’s assumptions about the veracity of DAI, moreover they have alsobeen exposed to in-house training. But these factors do not explain their very differentnegotiating strategies with management. For the ‘cynic’, although veracious, DAI does notdefine constituents’ interests – rather it is taken as a lexicon that might be applied in theirfurtherance or discarded when it appears to be incommensurable. While these artful bargainersshare with ‘realists’ an ambivalence towards trade union notions of solidarity, this is overlaidby a combative and parochial image of the ‘us’, while the ‘them’ pertains to anyone outsidethat immediate constituency.The ‘cynic’s’ parochialism creates a perceived need to defend constituents from the everpresent threats from other groups. This concern appears to override the immanentimplications of their acceptance of DAI as veracious and their exposure to in-companyfinancial training. Although DAI may be the harbinger of an immutable financial reality, theintercession of this imagery prevents the translation of these ‘truths’ into the attitudes andpractices of the ‘realist’. Instead the cynic’s ‘war’ leads to their Machiavellian pursuit of