From the Beginning to Plato

THE ERRORS OF OTHER PEOPLE
Much of the material that we have considered so far has included disparaging
remarks about the inability of ordinary mortals to comprehend what is before
their eyes. In fragment B1 the word for ‘out of touch’ (axunetoi), describing
those who fail to comprehend the logos, appears to pun with the texts that stress
the importance of what is ‘common’ (xunos). The word also occurs in B34:
Those who are out of touch [axunetoi], having heard, are just like deaf
people; it is to them that the saying testifies that though present they are
absent. 90
What the ordinary observer is out of touch with is that which is common, on
which those who speak with sense (xun noōi) rely absolutely (B114). 91 As in the
case of those who blindly use their eyes and fail to grasp what is really important,
so those who listen but fail to hear are like the deaf. It is possible, and indeed
usual, according to Heraclitus, to use the senses but to fail to make contact with
what is common, to go through life asleep, and to be out of touch with what one
has heard.
How, then, can one improve or gain understanding? Not, it appears, by means
of learning from other supposedly wise people, for it is not only Homer who fails
to live up to his reputation for wisdom, but also Hesiod:
Hesiod is the teacher of a great many; they understand that he knew a great
many things, though he did not recognize day and night. For they are one.
(B57) 92
and all the other well-respected authorities:
FROM THE BEGINNING TO PLATO 99
Quantity of learning does not teach sense, otherwise it would have taught
Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus.
(B40) 93
Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, was the most assiduous researcher of all
mankind, and by excerpting from these writings he made his own wisdom:
quantity of learning, bad practice.
(B129) 94
A consistent theme in these criticisms of the teachers respected by most is the
notion that the quantity of things known is no guarantee of wisdom. Yet
Heraclitus also seems to have said that ‘philosophical men have to be researchers
of a very great quantity of things’ (B35). 95 If the ‘philosopher’ here is a man of
true wisdom there seems to be some conflict with the claim that the quantity of
things known is no guide in the attainment of sense. An alternative way of taking