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From the Beginning to Plato

From the Beginning to Plato

From the Beginning to Plato

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232 THE SOPHISTS<br />

not innate, nor is it in fact acquired au<strong>to</strong>matically; it is <strong>the</strong> product of a process<br />

of education, which starts in infancy. The fact that <strong>the</strong> individual’s share in <strong>the</strong>se<br />

two essential qualities is acquired and <strong>the</strong>n developed by teaching provides a<br />

justification for <strong>the</strong> profession of <strong>the</strong> sophist, who is able <strong>to</strong> regard himself as an<br />

exceptionally able teacher. The whole approach provides a <strong>the</strong>ory of justification<br />

—<strong>the</strong> first known <strong>to</strong> his<strong>to</strong>ry —for participa<strong>to</strong>ry democracy. All citizens have a<br />

claim <strong>to</strong> participation in <strong>the</strong> political processes of <strong>the</strong> city since all share in <strong>the</strong><br />

qualities needed for <strong>the</strong> city <strong>to</strong> function. But <strong>the</strong>y do not share equally in <strong>the</strong>se<br />

qualities, and it is accordingly appropriate that within a democracy leadership<br />

should be exercised by those who are exceptionally able. Many o<strong>the</strong>r aspects of<br />

normal political activity at A<strong>the</strong>ns and elsewhere in Greece were probably<br />

discussed in Protagoras’ political writings—we have brief notes <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> effect that<br />

he discussed a <strong>the</strong>ory of punishment as something <strong>to</strong> be accepted both as a<br />

deterrent and also as a form of education leading <strong>to</strong> reform of <strong>the</strong> errant<br />

individual. Finally mention may be made of <strong>the</strong> intriguing and puzzling statement,<br />

found in Diogenes Laertius (III.57, DK 80 B 5), that <strong>the</strong> whole of <strong>the</strong> content of<br />

Pla<strong>to</strong>’s Republic was <strong>to</strong> be found in <strong>the</strong> work by Protagoras entitled<br />

Contradic<strong>to</strong>ry Arguments (Antilogikoi Logoi). While this in itself is clearly not<br />

credible, that it could even be said <strong>to</strong> be <strong>the</strong> case is perhaps evidence of <strong>the</strong><br />

extremely wide-ranging nature of Protagoras’ writings on politics. More<br />

precisely, it may have been possible for an enthusiastic supporter of what<br />

Protagoras had written <strong>to</strong> discern structural similarities with <strong>the</strong> Republic, in<br />

which Pla<strong>to</strong> is concerned with <strong>the</strong> development of rational societies from earlier<br />

organizations that had not yet grasped <strong>the</strong> need for a rational understanding of<br />

and a just respect for <strong>the</strong> functions of o<strong>the</strong>r citizens.<br />

It is possible that <strong>the</strong> unifying basis of Protagoras’ numerous <strong>the</strong>ories was<br />

always his distinctive method of arguing. The tradition preserved by Diogenes<br />

Laertius (IX.51) tells us that Protagoras was <strong>the</strong> first <strong>to</strong> declare that in <strong>the</strong> case of<br />

every question <strong>the</strong>re are two arguments opposed <strong>to</strong> each o<strong>the</strong>r, and that he used<br />

this supposed fact as a method of debate. We can expand this statement from<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r sources somewhat as follows: of <strong>the</strong> two arguments one will be positive,<br />

stating that something is <strong>the</strong> case, and <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r will be negative, stating that<br />

something is not <strong>the</strong> case. In <strong>the</strong> light of <strong>the</strong> man-measure doctrine both of <strong>the</strong><br />

opposing arguments will be true in virtue of <strong>the</strong>ir position in <strong>the</strong> world of<br />

appearances. But one view will, at least on certain occasions, be better than <strong>the</strong><br />

o<strong>the</strong>r in that it promotes more desirable results. When one of <strong>the</strong> two contrary<br />

arguments is proposed, one that does not promote desirable effects, such an<br />

argument may seem <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> ill-informed person <strong>to</strong> be <strong>the</strong> stronger of <strong>the</strong> two<br />

arguments. It is <strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> task of <strong>the</strong> wise man <strong>to</strong> make <strong>the</strong> weaker argument<br />

stronger so that it will prevail in competition with what <strong>the</strong>n becomes <strong>the</strong><br />

weaker argument. To do this is <strong>the</strong> function of <strong>the</strong> ora<strong>to</strong>r in a developed political<br />

society. It is also <strong>the</strong> function of <strong>the</strong> sophist as teacher <strong>to</strong> make <strong>the</strong> weaker argument<br />

stronger and <strong>to</strong> show o<strong>the</strong>rs how <strong>to</strong> do this. An interesting application of this<br />

approach may perhaps be seen in Protagoras’ detailed consideration of <strong>the</strong> nature

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