From the Beginning to Plato

402 FROM THE BEGINNING TO PLATO
sexual union, being satisfied by another, ‘being with’ Beauty, such a scenario is
—as I have already argued—incompatible with Platonic tripartition, and it is
equally incompatible with any other conception of the soul which is represented
in the dialogues (in the Symposium itself Socrates says nothing about what the
soul is, or is like, just as he says nothing about its mortality or immortality). In
terms of tripartition, the model for the soul adopted by that other dialogue on
love, the Phaedrus, the ‘ascent of love’ would rather be a matter of the disguised
substitution of the fulfilment of one sort of desire for the fulfilment of another. 37
But so remarkable will the experience of the philosopher’s ‘erotic’ initiation be,
on Socrates’ account, that he will never miss what he once left behind.
The idea of reason as itself desiring and passionate also not only fits, but is
demanded by, the sort of view of the soul which we found Plato favouring in the
Phaedo, and to which he returns at the end of the Republic, even after having
argued at length for tripartition. 38 If soul is in its essence rational and unitary, and
capable of floating free through the universe, and perhaps especially if it
activates and animates bodies, it cannot be pure rationality; thinking about things,
even including doing them, by itself moves nothing. That is, without desire a
unitary rational soul does not look like a remotely plausible candidate as a selfmover
or source of movement for other things; it would, as we might put it, just
lack a motive for doing anything.
Of course, the more reason appears like a separate agent, the greater the
problems for the tripartite model. Similarly also in the case of the other parts: it
will not be particularly helpful to analyse the soul, as a spring of action, into
three more. 39 Perhaps that should encourage us to take seriously Plato’s hint at
the end of the Republic, and to suppose that he ultimately prefers a Phaedo-type
view. But this is a less than completely satisfactory solution. The prominence of
the idea of the tripartite soul, both in the Republic and elsewhere, reflects Plato’s
interest in the fact of internal conflict which it purports to explain, and makes it
hard either for us or for him to set it aside. A better conclusion might be just that
he finds the arguments for the two conceptions of soul equally balanced, and
veers between the two as the context demands, just as he does between the
different conceptions of humanity which they imply.
LITERATURE AND ART
Plato returns repeatedly to the subject of literature, particularly poetry, and his
treatment of the poets is always hostile. One important passage which is often
taken as an exception, and as marking a softening in his attitude, in fact includes
some of the main themes of his attacks elsewhere. The passage is the one in the
Phaedrus briefly referred to earlier, where Socrates is introducing the idea of
erotic madness, and comparing it to other forms of madness. Third among these
is ‘possession and madness from the Muses’, which issues in ‘lyric and the rest of
poetry’, and ‘by adorning countless achievements of past generations educates
those who come after’ (245a). Socrates contrasts this inspired poetry with poetry