From the Beginning to Plato

354 PLATO: METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY
Next, we must be clear about the fact that a statement has two kinds of parts
that function in different ways. The name signifies the being in the world that the
statement is about, while the verb signifies what is said about the subject, namely
the being in the world that is the attribute ascribed to the subject.
‘Theaetetus is sitting’ is true if sitting ‘is with respect to Theaetetus’, i.e. if
sitting=one of his attributes. And then ‘Theaetetus flies’ is false if flying ‘is not with
respect to Theaetetus’, i.e. is different from every attribute that is with respect to
Theaetetus. The fact that in this false statement what is not is said of Theaetetus
does not mean that nothing is said about Theaetetus. For here what is not is not
the non-existent or non-existence 67 but flying—a being.
Plato’s solution marks a major advance when he clearly signals the difference
between the ways in which words and statements function. But with no clear
notion of sense as distinct from reference, he still has nothing to say on the
question of what could constitute the content of a false statement.
NOTES
1 My understanding of the Theory of Forms owes most to Ryle [10.43] and Frede
[10.74]. See also Graeser [10.76], Ross [10.92]; Wedberg, ‘The Theory of Ideas’,
in [10.97], 28–52; Bostock [10.67], 94–101, 194–201, 207–13. Crombie [10.36]
can be consulted on all subjects covered by this chapter. I am very grateful to
Christopher Taylor for his extensive and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
chapter.
Any discussion of the topics I discuss is bound to be controversial and some
alternative interpretations can be found in works cited in the notes and
bibliography. Limitations of space compel these references to be highly selective.
2 I assume the generally agreed view that the earliest dialogues closely reflect the
methods and beliefs of the historical Socrates, but that in middle period dialogues
the character of Socrates expresses views which go far beyond those of Plato’s
teacher.
3 Cf. the argument ‘from things that are no more’ from Aristotle’s On Ideas in [10.
63], 81–2. Note that the point in the text applies just as much to ‘horse’ and ‘finger’
as it does to ‘beauty’ and ‘one’. Some believe Republic 523–5’s distinction
between concepts that do and do not give rise to thought shows that Forms are not
needed for concepts such as ‘horse’ which, like the concept of ‘finger’, do not give
rise to thought. But the passage only indicates that perception of particular fingers
may suffice, epistemically, for recollection of the Form of Finger. The latter is an
object of thought as distinct from perceptible fingers as the perceptible and
‘oppositeless’ squares and circles drawn in the sand are distinct from their
corresponding Forms which are the objects of the mathematician’s thought
(Republic 510d–511a).
4 Cratylus 431b–c; cf. 432e, 385b–c. Similarly with the philosopher Parmenides:
what is required for thought was not distinguished from what is required for speech.